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Status of Refugees and the European
Convention on Human Rights
MARYELLEN FULLERTON*
INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1980's has been a decade of refugees. Millions of
people have fled their homelands as a result of oppression, strife, natu-
ral disaster, and poverty.' Most refugees have remained in Asia and
Africa, in countries neighboring their homelands.' Some refugees,
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank the Fulbright
Program and the Brooklyn Law School Sabbatical Program for funding this research. In
addition, the author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and generous assistance of
the following individuals: Gunnar Homann, Gilbert Jaeger, Eva Kjaergaard, Rudolf Klever,
Lex Takkenberg, and Simone Wolken. The author is responsible for the views and analysis
presented in this Article;, any errors are solely the author's.
1. John McCallin, Washington Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner
of Refugees (UNHCR) estimates there are 12 to 13 million refugees in the world. Interview
with John McCallin, Monday (weekly newsletter on refugee and immigration issues), Sept. 5,
1988, at 3. See also Zarjevski, France: Right-of-asylum Campaign Inaugurated, Refugees
(official publication of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), Mar.
1986, at 13 (noting that 12 million refugees are currcntly registered in the world); W. Smyser,
Refugees: Extended Exile 1 (1987) (estimating that there are up to 10 to 12 million refugees in
the world).
2. Zarjevski, supra note 1, at 13. There are approximately 2.9 million refugees from
Afghanistan in Pakistan. UNHCR Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Report for 1986-
s7 and Proposed Programmes and Budget for 1988, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/693 (Part V), at 21,
5.6.1 [hereinafter UNHCR Report]; UNHCR Fact Sheet: Pakistan, Oct. 1987, r 1. In
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however, fled from Africa and Asia to Europe and sought asylum
there. During the first half of the decade the number of Third World
asylum-seekers in northern Europe increased substantially. 3 This sig-
nificant upsurge in asylum-seekers created logistical problems. The
numbers of arrivals outstripped the accommodations provided for ref-
ugees and sometimes overwhelmed the refugee determination process,
creating long delays in the resolution of cases. The increase in asy-
lum-seekers also had a more pernicious effect. Governments, over-
whelmed by the number of asylum-seekers and fearing a never-ending
flow of refugees, began to apply more restrictive administrative meas-
ures to asylum-seekers in their countries. In addition, many govern-
ments began considering legislation that would more directly deter
individuals from seeking asylum in their countries. A "bandwagon"
effect occurred. Sponsors of legislative change in one country would
point out that other countries appeared to be adopting more restric-
tive refugee policies and that a failure to follow with similar restric-
tions would result in a deluge of asylum-seekers turned away by
neighboring countries.
This argument and others prevailed in a number of the northern
European countries. The center-right coalition governments in
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
Netherlands were receptive to initiatives to limit the influx of asylum-
seekers by acting in concert with neighboring countries.4 As a result,
in 1986 and 1987 a variety of legislative measures aimed at stemming
addition, there are reportedly 2.2 million Afghani refugees in Iran, UNHCR Report, supra, at
10, % 5.4.1, 975,000 refugees in the Sudan, UNHCR Fact Sheet: Sudan, Oct. 1987, % 1, and
840,000 refugees in Somalia. UNHCR Fact Sheet: Somalia, Oct. 1987, 1.
3. Between 1981 and 1985 the yearly applications for asylum increased from 2,445 to 5,357
in Belgium, from 203 to 8,698 in Denmark, from 754 to 5,644 in the Netherlands, and from
49,391 to 73,832 in the Federal Republic of Germany. Report on the Right to Asylum drawn
up on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights (The Vetter Report to the
European Parliament), Eur. Par]. Doc. A2-227/86/B, Feb. 23, 1987 at 7. Although the figures
demonstrate a major change in the number of refugees seeking asylum in northern Europe,
they are still small compared to the numbers of refugees remaining in the Third World.
Approximately 850,000 asylum-seekers came to Europe between 1975 and 1985. Estimates are
that 5% of the world's current refugees have attempted to enter the industrialized countries
while 95% of the refugees remain in underdeveloped countries. Kjaerum, The Danish
Procedure of Denial of Entry into Denmark, in Current Asylum Policy and Humanitarian
Principles 3, 8-9 (1988).
4. The situation was similar in other European countries also. For example, in 1985
France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands
entered into the Schengen agreement which, in part, attempted to coordinate refugee policies
of the signatory nations. Dutch Treaty Series 1985, nr. 102. See Meijers, Possibilities for
Guaranteeing Transport to Refugees, in The Role of Airline Companies in the Asylum
Procedure 16, 18-19 (1988). Earlier, the Council of Europe, comprised of 21 European
nations, established an Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Asylum (CAHAR) to study the
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the flow of refugees were enacted in Europe.5 A common theme of
deterrence, in particular, restriction of entry at the border, runs
through the new laws. Additionally, two significant provisions fre-
quently recur: the grant of broad authority to border police to deny
admission summarily to individuals falling into certain disfavored cat-
egories; and the imposition of large fines and other financial penalties
on air carriers that transport undocumented asylum-seekers to a
country. Each measure may sound unobjectionable - or only
slightly objectionable - on its own; applied together, however, these
provisions enable authorities to prevent thousands of asylum-seekers
from ever entering a country to seek refuge. As a result, most asylum-
seekers are excluded from the refugee determination process. Conse-
quently, they have little opportunity to present fully their claims for
refugee status and cannot seek administrative or judicial review of
incorrect decisions.
Due to these newly enacted measures, many individuals with well-
founded fears of persecution will be turned back from the borders of
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
Netherlands.6 The rejection of bona fide refugees is not only unwise
social policy and objectionable on moral grounds, but is also question-
able as a matter of law. All four of the countries surveyed are signato-
ries of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees7 and
problem and propose joint solutions to the continuing flow of refugees. Uipobuu, What Rights
for Refugees?, Forum [Council of Europe publication], Feb. 1983. at XIX.
5. This was, in fact, the second round of refugee legislation. The early 1980's had also seen
a flurry of legal measures regarding refugees. See, e.g., Law of Dec. 15, 1980, on access to the
territory, sojourn, establishment and removal of aliens (Belgium); Ordinance of May 23, 1980
concerning the entry and sojourn of aliens in Denmark (Denmark); Law of July 16, 1982 on
Asylum Procedure (Federal Republic of Germany); Alien's Circular of OCL 26, 1982
(Netherlands).
6. Although these four countries are the focus of this article, similar treatment is likely to
occur in other European countries. For example, in April 1987 Switzerland passed legislation
restricting border crossings by asylum-seekers, Netter, Swiss Vote to Tighten Refugee Law,
Int'l Herald Tribune, Apr. 6, 1987 at 1, and the United Kingdom enacted legislation to fine
airlines £1000. per passenger without proper travel documents. Refugees, Apr. 1987, at 22. In
addition, the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community held several
meetings to coordinate methods of reducing the flow of asylum-seekers into the 12 European
Community countries. In May, 1987 the Ministers agreed on the advisability of sanctions on
airline carriers, Street, Ministers Get Tough on Refugees, The Bulletin, May 7, 1987, at 16; in
December 1987 the Ministers agreed that nationals of 50 countries would be required to obtain
visas for entry into the European Community countries. Feller, Transport Carriers and
Refugee Protection, in The Role of Airline Companies in the Asylum Procedure 6 (1988).
7. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention].
The scope of protection of the Geneva Convention was considerably broadened by the
Protocol of 1967 Relating to the Status of Refugees, see infra note 299. Most or the signatories
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of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.' Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention
prohibits the return of refugees to countries in which their lives or
freedom would be threatened. 9 Article 3 of the Human Rights Con-
vention forbids torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.10
Returning individuals to a particular country in which they might be
endangered has been acknowledged in certain circumstances as inhu-
man treatment within the meaning of Article 3.11
This Article undertakes a country-by-country examination of the
recent legal developments restricting entry of asylum-seekers at the
border. It next analyzes the newly-enacted measures and details the
shortcomings that many of them share. The Article then evaluates
the new provisions in light of the legal duties imposed on signatories
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Convention on
Human Rights. It concludes by suggesting that the current wave of
restrictive legislation,12 especially the provisions authorizing summary
rejection of asylum-seekers at the border, violates both the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention and the European Human Rights Convention.
to the 1951 Convention, including Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
the Netherlands, are also signatories to the Protocol.
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Human Rights Convention].
9. Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, provides in pertinent part:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.
Id.
10. Article 3 of the Human Rights Convention, supra note 8, provides:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
Id.
11. Amekrane v. The United Kingdom, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Hum. Rts. 356 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
12. Ironically, some of these legislative changes appear to adopt policies long followed by
the U.S. government. For example, all aliens must have a valid visa to enter the United States.
INA § 212(a)(20), (26)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20), (26)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In
addition, the United States authorizes fines on carriers that bring aliens without proper
documents to the United States. INA § 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1323. The provisions adopted in
Europe in 1986 and 1987 may to some extent constitute an "Americanization" of European
asylum law; however, U.S. law contains far more procedural protection than the new summary
border procedures adopted in Europe. For example, asylum-seekers stopped at the borders of
the United States are guaranteed hearings before immigration judges, INA § 236, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), and full administrative and judicial review, INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(b),
1105a(b).
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I. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS RESTRICTING ENTRY OF
ASYLUM-SEEKERS AT THE BORDER
A. Belgium
L Entry for Asylum-Seekers
Prior to 1987 the Belgian law1 3 setting forth the rights of refugees
and asylum-seekers' 4 was quite generous. The law permitted any
non-Belgian who arrived at the border and stated that he was a refu-
gee to enter the country and petition for recognition as a refugee.'5 It
also provided that any alien who had entered Belgium lawfully in a
non-refugee status could seek recognition as a refugee during the time
he was lawfully present.' 6  In addition, aliens who had entered
Belgium unlawfully, without appropriate documents, had 15 days
within which to request refugee status.'7  Whether aliens requested
refugee status at the border or after entry, the law allowed them to
remain in the country while their refugee claims were processed.'
Even more unusual than these liberal entry requirements was the
refugee recognition procedure. Alone in Europe,' 9 the government of
Belgium granted to the Representative of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the ultimate power to decide
13. Loi du 15 d~cembre 1980 sur l'accs au territoire, le sijour, l'tablissement et
l'61oignement des 6trangers [Law of Dec. 15, 1980 on Access to the Territory. Sojourn,
Establishment, and Removal of Aliens], 1980 Moniteur Beige 14,584.
14. The Belgian legislation does not refer to asylum. Rather, it speaks in terms of access to
and sojourn in the territory of Belgium. Id. 1980 Moniteur Beige 14,584. An authorization to
sojourn is equivalent to the grant of asylum.
15. European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, Asylum in Europe 68, f 13 (1983)
[hereinafter Asylum in Europe].
16. Id. For example, aliens who entered as tourists or students could seek refugee status at
any time before their tourist or student visas expired. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 51, 1980
Moniteur Beige at 14,598. See Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 69, In 20.
17. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 50, 1980 Moniteur Beige at 14,597. See description infra,
note 39. See also Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 70, 27. Belgium does not require
tourist visas of visitors from certain countries, such as the United States, so long as they
remain in Belgium for no longer than three months. Id. art. 6, 1982 Moniteur Beige at 14,586.
An individual who entered Belgium under this provision generally could request refugee status
at any time during those three months. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 69, para. 20.
18. A 1983 report notes that refugees in Belgium enjoy "a status very close to that of
Belgian nationals." Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 82, c' 104. Individuals in Belgium
seeking those rights are referred to as refugee candidates. For purposes of this Article, the
terms refugee candidate and asylum-seeker are synonymous.
19. At one time the Netherlands had a somewhat similar situation regarding the role of the
UNHCR, but this was revised in the early 1970's. Since then, the Minister of Justice in the
Netherlands has decided whether or not to grant refugee status and asylum. Interview with
Lex Takkenberg, Chief Legal Advisor, VluchtelingenWerk Nederland (Dutch Refugee
Council), in Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany (Nov. 29, 1986) [hereinafter Takkenbcrg
Interview II].
40 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
which applicants qualified as refugees.20 This grant of decision-mak-
ing authority to an international organization largely reduced the
overt political pressures that appear to influence the refugee decision
process in other countries.2' Because Belgian officials had no voice in
determining whether an asylum-seeker was likely to face persecution
in his homeland, any impulse to consider Belgium's foreign policy
interests as a factor in deciding the likelihood of persecution in a par-
ticular country was muted.22
Although Belgian authorities did not decide the merits of claims for
refugee status, they did decide certain threshold issues. The Aliens
Office of the Ministry of Justice first examined each refugee claim filed
in Belgium to determine if the refugee candidate had filed a timely
application, had previously requested asylum in another country, or
had resided for more than three months in another country after leav-
ing his homeland and before arriving in Belgium.2 3 If the refugee can-
didate prevailed on these preliminary issues, the Ministry of Justice
declared his application "recevable" or eligible for consideration on
the merits by the UNHCR.24 Thus, in Belgium an alien deemed eligi-
ble to petition for refugee status presented his claim to the office of the
UNHCR Representative to Belgium. One of the Representative's
assistants reviewed the claim and developed the supporting evidence
through one or more informal interviews and through the documents
the refugee candidate submitted.25 The government took no position
on an application, but added interviews and background investiga-
tions conducted by the Aliens Office to the claimant's file.26
Both the informality of the procedure and the nonadversarial
nature of the decision-making process diminished the need for legal
20. Arrt6 minist6riel du 22 fevrier 1954 relatif i ]a comptence du d616gu6 en Belgique du
Haut Commissaire des Nations-Unies pour les r6fugi& pour d6terminer la qualit6 de rffugi6
[Ministerial Decree of Feb. 22, 1954 Relating to the Competence to Determine Refugee Status
of the Representative in Belgium of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees],
1954 Moniteur Belge 3124.
21. See, e.g., Political Bias in United States Refugee Policy Since the Refugee Act of 1980, 1
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 495 (1986).
22. But see Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making: The Systems of Ten Countries, 19
Stan. J. Int'l L. 235, 253-54 (1983) (noting that UNHCR's dependence on financial support
from governments for relief work may undermine its impartiality and suggesting that Belgian
government's financial support of UNHCR office in Brussels may compromise UNHCR's
independence).
23. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 52, 1980 Moniteur Belge at 14,598. See also Asylum in
Europe, supra note 15, at 72, 35.
24. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 72, 38.
25. Id. at 73, 1 44.
26. id. at Y2, 11 40 and 73, 44.
[Vol. 29:33
1988] RESTRICTING ASYLUM-SEEKERS
representation and protracted formal litigation. Applicants could be,
but usually were not, accompanied by a lawyer.27 The law did not
allow the Belgian government or the alien to appeal the UNHCR
Representative's decision.28 Decisions denying refugee status could,
however, be reopened at any time by the UNHCR Representative.29
The standard for reopening was extremely generous: "when new ele-
ments are brought to [the] ... attention [of the UNHCR Representa-
tive] or when it appears that an error or misunderstanding has
occurred."3 Thus, the procedure for deciding refugee claims pre-
served an enormous amount of flexibility for the UNHCR Represen-
tative. Although the Belgian refugee determination process was not
immune from criticism, 31 the international perspective and impartial-
ity of the decision-makers and the informality and flexibility of the
process added much to the system.
2. Recent Legislation
In July 1987 the Belgian Parliament enacted legislation fundamen-
tally changing the procedures affecting refugees.32 Although the new
27. Id. at 73, 46. Lawyers often contacted the UNHCR Office separately to review their
client's file, but did not, as a matter of course, attend UNHCR interviews of the client. Id.
28. Id. at 69, 18, 76, 65.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 69, 118. An additional safeguard lay in the practice developed by the UNHCR
Representative of allowing a refugee candidate three weeks after a negative decision to present
additional information supporting his claim to refugee status. Only at the end of the three
week period did the UNHCR Representative submit the negative decision to the Minister of
Justice, whose office oversees expulsions from the country. Id. at 76, r 64.
31. Many lawyers criticized the fact that the UNHCR decisions provided no basis for their
conclusions and the fact that no appeals were permitted. Avery, supra note 23, at 254-55.
Others argued that personnel in UNHCR Branch Offices are particularly sensitive to political
pressure from the host country. Id. at 254.
32. Loi du 14 juillet 1987 apportant des modifications, en ce qui concerne notamment les
r~fugiLs, A la loi du 15 dicembre 1980 sur l'accs au territoire, le s~jour, l'tablissement et
l'loignement des 6trangers [Law of July 14, 1987 Modifying, with Particular Regard to
Refugees, the Law of Dec. 15, 1980 Concerning Access to the Territory, Sojourn,
Establishment and Removal of Aliens], 1987 Moniteur Belge 11,111. Originally reported as
the Law of July 15, 1987, the date of the legislation was subsequently corrected to Law of July
14, 1987. See 1987 Moniteur Beige 12,210.
A short review of the political battle surrounding this legislation demonstrates the
controversy currently surrounding the refugee issue in Europe. Despite the fact that the
coalition government, the sponsors of the legislation, had an overwhelming majority in
Parliament, it took almost an entire year between introduction of the bill and its enactment.
The bill was championed by Jean Gol, Minister of Justice, a member of the rightist Liberal
Party and a leading member of the coalition government that led Belgium from 1982 to the
end of 1987. See Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: Crisis & Compromise in a Plural
Society 165 (1983); Leonard, Tough Policy On Would-Be Refugees, The Bulletin, July 31,
1986 at 11. Even before its official introduction, rumors of the Gol bill aroused much criticism
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legislation technically modified the existing statute regulating the
entry and residence of all foreigners, its provisions focused on refu-
gees. The heart of the bill revised the liberal entry requirements and
the role of the UNHCR in Belgium. In addition, the new law explic-
itly changed many other procedures that previously had benefited
individuals seeking admission as refugees.
The 1987 legislation revamps the Belgian procedure for recognizing
and protecting refugees by making four major changes in existing asy-
lum law. First, it grants broad authority to border police to turn
away asylum-seekers at the border.3 Second, it institutes a system of
fines for airlines and shipping companies who bring asylum-seekers
lacking proper passports and visas to Belgium.34 Third, it removes
the power to determine refugee status from the UNHCR and places it
with a newly created government Office for Refugees and Stateless
Persons.3 5  Finally, it eliminates the ability of asylum-seekers to
among the opposition Socialist Party and among lawyers in general. After the government
proposed the legislation to the House of Representatives, political and public criticism
managed to stall the bill for months. Interview with Gilbert Jaeger, President du Comit6 beige
d'aide aux rifugi~s (Chairman, Belgian Committee for Assistance to Refugees), in Brussels,
Belgium (Feb. 12, 1987) [hereinafter Jaeger Interview I]. Ultimately, however, the opposition
forces failed to prevent the passage of the measure or even to modify it significantly. The
House approved the bill by a large majority and referred it to the Senate. Lawyers and others
critical of the bill rallied to attempt to influence the deliberation in the Senate. The Minister of
Justice responded by inten-ifying the pressure on the Senate to support the legislation.
Interview with Gilbert Jaeger, Chairman, Belgian Committee for Assistance to Refugees, in
Brussels, Belgium (July 30, 1987). He let it be known that he would leave the government if
the Senate amended the bill in any way. The threat was powerful because his departure would
likely have caused the whole government, a rather fragile coalition, to fall. Acquiescing, the
Senate adopted the identical bill that had passed the House. Id. The coalition government
ultimately fell in October 1987. Montgomery, Belgium's Coalition Loses Ground in Election,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1987, at A6.
33. Law of July 14, 1987, art. 6, 1987 Moniteur Beige at 11,112. The authority granted
border police is considered in depth, infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. -
34. Law of July 14, 1987, art. 17, 1987 Moniteur Beige at 11,118. For a more detailed
discussion of these penalties, see infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
35. Law of July 14, 1987, art. 9, 1987 Moniteur Beige 11,113 (amending Law of Dec. 15,
1980 by adding new section 2, Articles 57/2 through 57/1l, entitled "Commissariat g~n6ral
aux r~fugi6s et aux apatrides" (Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons) to Chapter II of Title
II) (subsequent citations are to revised article numbers). The Belgian legislation'of 1987 in
effect rescinds the authority of the UNHCR Representative to determine which refugee
candidates are entitled to refugee status and protection under Belgian law. The law creates
within the Ministry of Justice a Commissariat gnral aux r~fugi~s et aux apatrides (Office for
Refugees and Stateless Persons). The Office is headed by a Commissaire g~n6ral (Director)
and two deputy directors, each of whom is nominated by the Minister of Justice and appointed
by the King. Each of the three must be Belgian, must be at least 30 years old, and must have
received a law degree. They are appointed for five year terms, and can be reappointed for
subsequent terms. Id. arts. 57/3 and 57/4.
The Director of the Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons has the power to recognize or
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refuse to recognize refugee status in light of the international conventions to which Belgium is
a party, to withdraw refugee status previously recognized, and to issue administrative
documents to refugees as provided for in Article 25 of the Geneva Convention of 1951 relating
the Status of Refugees. Id. art. 57/6. The law requires that decisions refusing to recognize
refugee status or withdrawing refugee status must explain why the particular circumstances of
the case resulted in a negative conclusion. Id. art. 57/6. The UNHCR Representative to
Belgium no longer plays an official role in the primary phase of the refugee recognition process.
The legislation merely authorizes the Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons to request
information from the UNHCR. Id. art. 57/7.
A refugee candidate dissatisfied with a decision by the Office for Refugees and Stateless
Persons can appeal. Article 10 of the Law of July 14, 1987 amends Chapter II of Title II of the
Law of December 15, 1980 to add section 3, consisting of Articles 57/12 through 57/23,
entitled "Commission permanente de recours des rffugi~s" (Refugee Appeals Commission).
The Appeals Commission consists of two chambers, one French-speaking and one Flemish-
speaking. Id. art. 57/12. Each chamber consists of a magistrate or counselor nominated by
the Minister of Justice, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an official of the Ministry
of Justice, and a lawyer nominated by the Minister of Justice after consultation with the
Belgian Bar Association. The Appeals Commission members are appointed by the King, and
serve for renewable terms of five years. Id. In proceedings appealed to the Commission, the
UNHCR Representative to Belgium plays an advisory role, and is authorized to be present at
each session of the Appeals Commission in order to provide advice concerning the specific
cases under consideration. Id. arts. 57/12-57/13. The magistrate or counselor assumes the
chairmanship of the chamber, tie votes are decided in favor of the position advocated by the
chairman of the chamber. Id. art. 57/13.
Appeals to the Appeals Commission must be filed within 30 days of notice of the negative
decision, id. art. 57/11, and may be filed only by aliens who reside in Belgium. Id. art. 57/16.
Thus, an asylum-seeker refused entry is ineligible to pursue his claim for refugee status from
abroad. An alien no longer residing in Belgium or one who does not comply within 30 days
with a request for information can be refused recognition as a refugee. Id. art. 57/17.
The filing of an appeal stays execution of the underlying decision. Id. art. 57/I1. An alien
may represent himself on appeal or may be represented by a lawyer of his choice. Id. art. 57/
18. If he lacks the funds to retain a lawyer, he will be provided a lawyer at public expense. Id.
Five working days before the scheduled hearing, the alien and his lawyer and a member of the
Ministry of Justice can review the administrative file. Id. art. 57/19. The Appeals
Commission must issue written decisions explaining their conclusion. Id. art. 57/22. These
decisions can be appealed to the Council of State. Id. art. 57/23.
The new recognition procedure with its newly created government agencies does not on its
face appear objectionable. In fact, the new procedures appear more protective of the rights of
refugee candidates. The right to counsel, id. art. 57/18, the right to present evidence on one's
own behalf, id. art. 57/21, and the right to interpreter services, id. art. 57/20, are all explicitly
protected by the legislation. In addition, the refugee candidate now has the right to receive a
written opinion explaining a negative decision. Id. art. 57/22. Further, the new law grants a
right to appeal. Id. art. 57/23. Indeed, the disappointed refugee candidate has two chances to
have an erroneous decision corrected: first, by the Refugee Appeals Commission, and second,
by the Council of State, a juridical body that is not part of the government bureaucracy. In
particular, these last two provisions add important new safeguards to the refugee process.
Whereas the right to counsel, the right to interpreter services, and the right to presentation of
evidence on one's own behalf are crucial and were not expressly mandated by the earlier law,
the practice of the UNHCR Representative to Belgium in fact always protected these rights.
The UNHCR Representative's decisions on refugee status did not contain written opinions
explaining the decisions, however, and this lack of explanation gave rise to frustration and
criticism among lawyers and refugee candidates. Similarly, the old law provided no appeal of
the UNHCR Representative's decision. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 69, 11 18.
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obtain an injunction against government action to expel them.36
Although a refugee candidate could always request a reopening and reconsideration of his file,
this avenue of potential relief was limited because it only involved a review by the same
decision-maker who had initially arrived at the allegedly incorrect decision. Thus, in at least
two provisions, the 1987 legislation contains more protective procedures for refugee
candidates.
Nonetheless, the new procedure raises some cause for concern on the part of refugee
candidates. The decision-maker under the new system is no longer an international civil
servant who is part of an organization whose mission is to aid refugees. Rather, decision-
making is located in two new agencies administered by the Minister of Justice, whose central
focus is law enforcement. Furthermore, the agency members serve renewable five year terms.
Thus, they are potentially subject to intense political pressure as well as to the gradual
development of a law enforcement mentality. Although the agency members may well attempt
to resist these pressures, nonetheless, these influences are likely to be substantially greater
under the new system than under the prior procedure. Therefore, there is a heightened risk
that domestic political pressure and xenophobia will affect the refugee recognition process.
It must be noted, however, that Marc Bossuyt, the first person appointed as Director of the
Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons, is a highly respected professor of international law at
the University of Antwerp, and a member of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. His
stature in the field and his commitment to human rights makes him an ideal choice to
administer the Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons.
36. Prior to 1987 Belgian lawyers representing refugee candidates on occasion initiated
court actions seeking to restrain a government official from carrying out an improper
administrative decision. If persuaded that the government action was unlawful, the court
could order the government agency to reconsider the matter using the proper criteria and
procedures. Jaeger Interview I, supra note 32. Known as refird, this type of proceeding could
protect litigants against government action that might moot their case. In the refugee context,
an alien might seek a refiri in order to halt the government's efforts to remove him from the
country before he could present his claim for refugee status to the UNHCR Representative's
office. For example, the Aliens Office might have decided his request for refugee status was
"non-receivable" because he had spent more than three months in another country en route
from his homeland to Belgium. If his refugee claim was non-receivable and he had no other
legitimate basis for residing in Belgium, the government would likely seek to expel him. Once
outside of Belgium he would have no ability to challenge the non-receivability decision or to
advance his petition for recognition as a refugee in Belgium. Consequently, a refugee
candidate might proceed in court in order to try to convince the government that its initial
decision had been incorrect. Although success by the refugee candidate on the refdrd
procedure only required the government to consider the matter again in light of the prescribed
procedures and criteria and did not guarantee the litigant the desired result on the merits, this
success granting the litigant a second chance assumed great importance in some refugee cases
because removal from the country could lead to dire results. Expulsion from the Belgium
would not only moot the refugee claim of a refugee candidate, but might also return the
individual to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened. Thus, the relief
provided by a successful refird proceeding, although temporary, could often be significant.
The 1987 legislation completely revised this procedure. In principle the law prohibits the
refird procedure, but in actuality, there are a few circumstances in which a refiri can still be
used. Article 16 of the Law of July 14, 1987 amends the Law of Dec. 15, 1980 by adding
Article 70bis, which provides for limited judicial review. An alien whom the government
attempts to return to a country where his life or liberty will be threatened may file an
emergency petition with the presiding judge of the local trial court. Law of July 14, 1987, art.
16, 1987 Moniteur Beige 11,118. The court must decide whether there is substantial evidence
that a serious threat to the refugee candidate's life or liberty exists. The law instructs the court
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Together, these provisions change Belgian policy from a flexible,
humanitarian approach to one hostile to asylum-seekers. The author-
ity granted border police and the fines on carriers, which operate
together to preclude most bona fide refugees from entering Belgium,
are the most critical and, accordingly, will be examined in greater
detail below.37
a. Authority to Border Police
Prior to 1987 an alien claiming refugee status at the border had the
absolute right under Belgian law to enter the country and initiate the
process of seeking formal acknowledgement as a refugee'.8  The law
required a refugee candidate entering without proper travel docu-
ments to report to a public official within 15 days of entry and claim
refugee status.39 As long as the individual satisfied this requirement
to use the rfrif procedure in deciding this issue. The law requires the court to render a
decision within 15 days. The decision cannot be enjoined or appealed. Id.
37. This is not to say that the procedures surrounding the process of determining refugee
status are insignificant. Quite the contrary is true. The fairness of these procedures is very
important. There is no indication, however, that the government Office for Refugees and
Stateless Persons will be unfair. Though by law the Office will be part of the Ministry of
Justice, Law of July 14, 1987, art. 9, 1987 Moniteur Beige at 11,114, and thus, by definition,
will be more sensitive to government pressure than the UNHCR Representative, the legislative
guidelines ensure such hallmarks of procedural fairness as notice, right to counsel, right to
present evidence, right to interpreter services, and right to written decisions. Furthermore, the
legislation provides judicial review for negative decisions, and automatic stay of the decision
challenged on appeal. Id.
Nor is this to say that the limitation of the refird (injunctive relief) provision regarding
expulsion orders, described supra note 36, is insignificant. The rdfiri proved useful to asylum-
seekers as they sought to garner evidence and assistance in order to support more convincingly
their asylum claim. This potential avenue of relief will be missed by asylum-seekers.
Nonetheless, both the limitation of temporary relief and the changes in the refugee
determination procedure are much less important than the legislative changes that prevent
refugee candidates from crossing the borders of Belgium. After all, the usefulness of
procedures provided to those in Belgium is irrelevant if few can enter Belgium to avail
themselves of those procedures.
38. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 71, 30. Belgian law authorizes an alien to enter
the territory of Belgium if he carries a document prescribed according to an international
treaty, law, or royal decree, or if he carries a valid passport or other travel document with a
visa valid for entry into Belgium issued by a Belgian, Dutch, or Luxembourg diplomatic or
consular official. In addition, the Minister of Justice can authorize the entry of an alien who
does not possess any of the prescribed documents. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 2, 1980
Moniteur Beige at 14,585.
39. Specifically, an alien entering Belgium without the required documents had to act
within 15 working days of his entry to (1) seek recognition of his refugee status from the
competent authority [UNHCR] and (2) give notice of his refugee claim to one of the following
officials: an officer of the judiciary police, a non-commissioned officer of the state police, an
agent of the Sdretdpublique, a customs official, or an official of the borough in which he lives.
Id. art. 50, 1980 Moniteur Belge at 14,597.
In addition, aliens legally entering Belgium under non-refugee status but seeking asylum had
46 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
and had not spent more than three months en route to Belgium from
his homeland in a third country where he was free from persecution,4 °
he could present his claim to the UNHCR for a decision on the
merits.41
The new legislation drastically revised the procedures applied to
potential refugees at borders and airports. It expressly authorizes the
Minister of Justice to turn away candidates claiming refugee status
but lacking proper travel documents under any of the following
circumstances42:
(1) the alien is considered a threat to public order or
national security;43
(2) the alien's refugee claim is manifestly unfounded,
and in particular is a fraudulent claim or is a claim that does
not conform to the criteria set forth by the Geneva Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees of 195 1, or to other
criteria for granting asylum;44
(3) the alien has a visa for a third country;45
(4) the alien since leaving his homeland has resided
more than a total of three months in one or more countries
en route to Belgium - and has left an interim stop without
fear of persecution there;
46
(5) the alien has been expelled from Belgium in the past
to apply for asylum before the end of their authorized stay. Id. art. 52, 1980 Moniteur Beige at
14,598.
40. The Minister of Justice could refuse entry or permission to remain if the alien delayed
filing his claim for refugee status without justification or if, between his departure from his
homeland and his arrival in Belgium, he resided more than three months in a third country
and voluntarily left that country. Id. art. 52, 1980 Moniteur Beige at 14,598.
41. Articles 49, 50, and 52 of the Law of Dec. 15, 1980 all refer to the international
authority to whom the Minister of Foreign Affairs has delegated his competence over refugee
status decisions. Id. arts. 49, 50, and 52, 1980 Moniteur Beige at 14,597-98. Although the
UNHCR Representative to Belgium is not expressly mentioned in the law, the decree of 22
February 1954 delegates decisions on refugee status to this official. See Ministerial Decree of
Feb. 22, 1954, art. 6, 1954 Moniteur Beige 3124.
42. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 52, 1980 Moniteur Beige at 14,598 as amended by Law of
July 14, 1987, art. 6, 1987 Moniteur Beige 11,112 (subsequent citations are to revised article
numbers).
43. Id. art. 52, § ler, para. 1, 1'.
44. Id. para. 1, 2*.
45. Id. para. 2, V.
46. Id. art. 52, § ler, para. 2, 3* and 4*. Paragraph 2, 30 refers to aliens who have resided
more than three months in a third country; 4 refers to aliens who have resided in a number of
third countries for a total of more than three months.
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10 years.47
The expansion of decisions concerning refugee status made at the bor-
ders is not accompanied by an expansion of safeguards to ensure accu-
rate decisions. Instead, the decision-making process, the criteria for
the decisions, and the review of the decisions have remained rudimen-
tary at best.
i. Summary Border Proceedings
The 1987 legislation authorizes summary rejection of certain refu-
gee candidates at the border,48 while providing neither a hearing nor
an interpreter. Moreover, the law lacks provisions for making a rec-
ord concerning the refugee's claim either on the merits or on the tech-
nical grounds for exclusion and lacks provisions for informing a
rejected refugee candidate of the basis of the decision denying entry.
Rather, the law simply states that the Minister of Justice or his dele-
gate49 can refuse to admit those refugee candidates who fall into the
disfavored categories and that the border guards can send them back
to the country from which they journeyed to Belgium.5° Because the
legislation seeks to tighten border controls and allow far fewer refugee
candidates into the country in an expeditious manner, it lacks proce-
dural safeguards. The absence of even minimal procedural protec-
tions magnifies the opportunity for honest error, as well as abuse.
ii. Criteria for Rejection at the Border
The summary nature of the decisions at the border is compounded
by the newly established criteria that lead to summary rejection. The
authorities enjoy a wide variety of grounds upon which to base denial
of entry to persons at the border seeking entry as refugees. Several of
the bases for summary rejection are quite vague, conferring in prac-
tice extremely broad power to border guards.51 For example, an alien
47. This prohibition does not apply if the expulsion has been suspended or annulled. Id. art.
52, para. 2, 20.
48. Article 52, § ler, para. 1 expressly permits the Minister of Justice to deny entry to
aliens claiming refugee status. ["Le Ministre de Justice peut d6cider que l'tranger qui ... se
d6clare rfugi6... fait l'objet d'un refus d'entre sur le territoire national ...."]. Id.
49. The legislation distinguishes between cases to be decided by the Minister of Justice
(public order or national security, manifestly unfounded claims) and those decided by the
Minister of Justice or his delegate (all of the rest). Id. art 52, § ler.
50. See id. art. 52, § ler, para. I (authorizing the Minister of Justice to refuse entry into
Belgium and the border guards to turn away the asylum-seeker. ("[L]' itranger... fait, l'objet
d'un refus d'entr~e sur le territoire national et qu' en consequence it sera refouh6 par les
autorits charges du contr6le aux fronti~res.")).
51. The legislation consigns the two vaguest criteria to decisions by the Minister of Justice;
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may be denied entry if he is considered a threat to public order or
national security; yet the legislation fails to define or limit these terms
in any way. Consequently, many different circumstances might be
interpreted to fit into these vague categories. Indeed, a country that
perceives itself inundated with refugees might possibly interpret a
large number of bona fide refugee candidates, on the basis of numbers
alone, as a threat to public order.
Similarly, the provision denying entry to a refugee whose claim is
"manifestly unfounded" is quite vague and broad. Although the leg-
islation describes several types of claims that would fall within this
provision, the examples are themselves vague - a "fraudulent" claim
or a claim that does not satisfy "other criteria that justify the grant of
asylum. ' ' 52 Again, this vagueness confers great power on the police at
the border. In addition, the text of the legislation literally includes as
an example of manifestly unfounded claims those not conforming to
the refugee definition set forth in the Geneva Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. 51 Thus, it is possible to construe every appli-
cation that does not ultimately succeed on the merits as manifestly
unfounded. Logic and common sense indicate that the "manifestly
unfounded" criterion should be construed more narrowly than
"unsuccessful." Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the legislative lan-
guage allows an extremely broad definition of "manifestly
unfounded" claims and, accordingly, a large number of summary
denials of entry at the border.
Other provisions justifying refusal of refugee candidates at the bor-
der are admittedly more precise. Exclusion of an alien expelled from
Belgium in the past ten years is straightforward. The provision
allowing Belgian authorities to turn away a refugee candidate possess-
the less vague criteria may be applied by either the Minister of Justice or his delegate. See
supra note 49. In fact, it is hard to imagine the Minister of Justice personally making all these
decisions. Common sense dictates that most decisions will have to be delegated, perhaps
directly to the border guards. Even if the Minister of Justice or some other high-level official
does decide these cases personally, he is dependent solely on the information he receives from
the border guards who have stopped the asylum-seeker.
52. Similar language appeared in Conclusions Number 28 and 30 of The Executive
Committee of the UNHCR. These conclusions recognized the need for effective measures to
deal with "manifestly unfounded" or "clearly abusive" applications for refugee status. See 33
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/33/12/Add. 1 (1978); 38 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 12A) at 25-26, U.N. Doc. A/38/12/Add. 1 (1983). Such measures were tolerable,
however, only in cases that are "clearly fraudulent or not related to the criteria for the granting
of refugee status laid down in the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees nor to any other criteria justifying the granting of asylum." Conclusion 30(d). 38
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 25-26, T 97(2)(d), U.N. Do. A/38/12/Add. 1 (1983).
53. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7.
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ing a travel visa valid for a destination in a third country is also not
difficult to comprehend, although the law itself may be difficult to
apply in certain instances. At first glance, the provision excluding
those refugees who have taken more than three months to make their
way to Belgium from their home elsewhere also appears compara-
tively clear. This appearance is deceptive. The legislation requires
that refugees who have spent more than three months en route must
show that they feared persecution in the last country they entered
prior to Belgium.- The difficulty of establishing freedom from fear of
persecution is legendary, and this issue is not one susceptible of quick
determination. Moreover, even if this legislative provision were easy
to apply, it would be troublesome. This provision and the third coun-
try visa provision expressly attempt to restrict the flow of bona fide
refugees into Belgium. They do not seek to address the problem of
refugee candidates who themselves are deemed suspect or trouble-
some, such as those threatening national security or making fraudu-
lent claims or having been recently expelled, but rather simply push
these refugees elsewhere - to other countries further along the route
or back to countries through which they have already passed. In
addition, the provisions exacerbate the problem of the "refugee in
orbit," whose unquestionably meritorious claim is nonetheless
rejected by one country after another because of the belief that some
other country is more appropriate to receive him.55
54. Indeed, the new legislation explicitly provides for refusal of entry to refugee candidates
who have resided in a third country more than three months en route to Belgium or have
resided more than three months total in a number of third countries. The legislation
authorizes refusal of entry only when the three month residence has occurred in a country
where the refugee candidate did not have a fear of persecution within the meaning of the 1951
Refugee Convention. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 52, § ler, para. 2, 3* and 4*. Although the
language is reasonably precise compared to "public order," "national security," and
"manifestly unfounded," there are ambiguities. For example, what constitutes residence?
What evidence is relevant to the issue of fear that propelled departure from a third country?
What degree of certainty exists that the third country will not return the refugee candidate to
his homeland?
55. The "refugee in orbit" syndrome came to public attention in the 1970's as more Third
World asylum-seekers arrived in Europe and North America. See Melander, Refugees in
Orbit, in African Refugees and the Law 27 (G. Melander & P. Nobel eds. 1978); Uipobuu.
supra note 4, XVIII, XIX. The typical scenario involved one country after another rejecting
an asylum-seeker on technical grounds and placing him on an airplane or train bound for yet
another country where his admission was uncertain. For example, based on its treaty with the
Federal Republic of Germany, and without regard to the sufficiency of his proof that he was a
bona fide refugee, Denmark might return an Afghan asylum-seeker to the Federal Republic of
Germany merely because he had crossed through the Federal Republic on his way to
Denmark. The Federal Republic might refuse to admit him and put him on a flight to
Pakistan on the theory that he had already found "protection elsewhere" (in Pakistan). If
Pa-; ,,- -efused to allow him to disembark from the airplane, the carrier was likely to return
1988]
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iii. Lack of Effective Appeal
More troubling, perhaps, than either the vagueness of some criteria
or the clear but restrictive nature of other provisions is the failure of
the new Belgian legislation to provide for effective appeal of the sum-
mary rejection of a refugee candidate at the border. Thus, mistakes of
the Belgian border authorities, which can occur with even the best-
intentioned officials, will often go uncorrected. For refugees, such
mistakes are more than abstract error. They can be life or death
matters.
Although the new law precludes appeals to judicial authorities, it
affords a measure of protection through the possibility of reconsidera-
tion of the denial of entry at the border or airport.56 The request for
reconsideration must be filed with the Minister of Justice within 24
hours of notice of the negative decision.5 7 The Minister of Justice
must seek the opinion of the Director of the Office for Refugees and
Stateless Persons, who must provide his opinion within 24 hours.58
The Minister of Justice is not bound to follow the opinion of the
the asylum-seeker to Europe where the process could repeat itself. During all this time, the
asylum-seeker would likely be lodged only in airplanes and airport lounges. Obviously, such a
situation presented a very distasteful and inhuman response to a serious problem. The
Executive Committee of the UNHCR attempted to address this problem in 1979, 30th Session,
Conclusion No. 15 by urging cooperation among refugee-receiving countries. See 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/10012/Add. 1 (1975). For a short description of
the phenomenon of refugees in orbit, see also Lamb, Knocking on Haven's Door, Refugees,
June 1987, at 10. Case studies illustrating the refugee in orbit syndrome can be found in
Castellani, Expulsion of Asylum Seekers From Denmark, in Current Asylum Policy and
Humanitarian Principles 31, 35, 40, 57 (1988).
56. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, 1980 Moniteur Belge 14,584 as amended by Law of July 14, 1987,
art. 14, 1987 Moniteur Beige at 11,117 (subsequent citations are to revised article numbers).
This revision added a new Article 63/2 that authorizes an immediate request for
reconsideration by the Minister of Justice ("une demande urgente de riexamen auprls du
Ministre de la Justice").
A description of this reconsideration process reveals its inadequacy as a substitute for an
administrative or judicial appeal procedure. Reconsideration requests are addressed to the
Minister of Justice. Technically, the Minister of Justice or his delegate also makes the decision
summarily refusing entry at the border. Thus, the refugee candidate merely has the
opportunity to ask the same official who made the initial negative decision to change his mind.
The refugee candidate must act immediately and has no time to gather further evidence that he
is a refugee. Indeed, the candidate may not even know what further evidence would be
pertinent, as the law does not require the Minister of Justice to state the basis of his initial
decision.
57. Id. art. 63/2, para. 2. An asylum-seeker admitted to Belgium but refused authorization
to remain has three working days in which to seek reconsideration. Id.
58. Id. art. 63/2, paras. 3-4. The Director heads the Office for Refugees and Stateless
Persons. This agency replaces the UNHCR in deciding the merits of claims to refugee status.
Law of July 14, 1987, art. 9. For a description of the UNHCR's role before the 1987
legislation, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
[VCol. 29:33
1988] RESTRICTING ASYLUM-SEEKERS
.Director,59 but if he chooses to maintain the denial of admission
despite a contrary opinion by the Director, he must provide reasons
for his decision.6 If the Minister of Justice continues to refuse entry,
the refugee candidate may seek administrative review of the decision
by the Council of State.6' Filing a petition for review with the Coun-
cil of State does not, however, stay the order refusing entry and
returning the refugee candidate to the country from which he came.62
Thus, the right of review remains a safeguard in theory but provides
no protection in practice.63
In one instance the new legislation does mandate a limited judicial
review of a summary denial of entry. When a refugee candidate
denied entry alleges that his life or liberty will be endangered if turned
back to the country from which he came, he may present an emer-
gency petition to the presiding judge of the local court of first
instance.6" He must present his claim within two working days of the
decision to refuse entry.65 The judge is limited to deciding whether
59. If an individual who commands enormous respect is appointed Director of the Office for
Refugees and Stateless Persons, his recommendations may carry great weight even though
they do not technically limit the authority of the Minister of Justice. Indeed, there are
indications that the first person appointed to this position, discussed supra note 35, has such
influence.
60. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 63/2, para. 6. If the decision refusing entry was made by a
delegate of the Minister of Justice, the request for reconsideration is addressed to the delegate.
The same reconsideration procedure applies except that the delegate is bound to follow the
Director's recommendation that the refugee candidate be allowed to enter Belgium. See id.
art. 63/3, paras. 1-5.
61. Id. art. 63/4 (providing that the decision of the Minister of Justice concerning the
request for reconsideration must be sent to the refugee candidate). The refugee candidate is
simultaneously informed of the right to appeal the decision to the Council of State and of the
time limit during which the appeal must be filed. Id.
62. Appeals to the Council of State suspend the enforcement of an administrative decision
only if the legislation specifies such a suspension. The Law of July 14, 1987 does not provide
that the appeal to the Council of State will have suspensive effect. In contrast. Article 63/5
provides that the government may not enforce its orders during the pendency of a request for
reconsideration. Cf. Law of July 14, 1987, art. 9, 1987 Moniteur Beige at 11,113 (amending
the Law of Dec. 15, 1980 by adding article 57/11, which stays execution of a negative decision
challenged before the Refugee Appeals Commission).
63. Although leaving Belgian territory does not technically moot the appeal, it is extremely
unlikely that a refugee candidate who is not in Belgium can obtain effective legal counsel to
plead his cause in Belgium. Even if the refugee managed to obtain a qualified lawyer, the
distance will certainly impede his ability to assist his attorney in preparing an effective appeal.
64. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 70, 1980 Moniteur Beige at 14,603 as amended by Law of
July 14, 1987, art. 16, 1987 Moniteur Beige at I 1,118 (adding art. 70bis) (subsequent citations
are to revised article numbers). Article 70bis authorizes judicial review of refused claims
where the asylum-seeker contends that the refusal of admission (or expulsion) will jeopardize
his life or freedom (".. . sa vie ou sa libert6 serait menac&.. ."). See also discussion of limited
judicial review supra note 36.
65. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 70bis.
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danger to the refugee candidate's life or liberty exists.66 He must
render a decision within 15 days of the filing of the claim, 67 and the
decision is final.68
Although the pre-1987 Belgian law provided no formal appeal pro-
cess to an individual denied refugee status, 69 the new legislation's
inadequate review of border decisions is far worse. 0 Under the prior
law, anyone stating he was a refugee was allowed to enter the country.
He applied for refugee status to the UNHCR Representative who pro-
vided the refugee candidate with an extensive opportunity to present
his claims and to develop his supporting evidence.7 There was noth-
ing summary about the process. Furthermore, though the pre-1987
law did not permit a formal appeal of the UNHCR Representative's
decision, broad power to reopen and reexamine the case in a deliber-
ate and full manner did exist.72 Moreover, the pre-1987 legislation
provided that refugee candidates deemed ineligible for refugee status
and ordered by the Belgian authorities to leave the country could pro-
test that government action through an administrative appeals pro-
cess. 7 3 Thus, in contrast to those refused entry at the border pursuant
to the 1987 legislation, refugee candidates admitted to Belgium prior
66. Id. The judge is instructed to apply the procedures that have developed with regard to
the refird, an injunction-like proceeding. Id. art. 70bis, para. 2. See also discussion supra note
36.
67. Id. art. 70bis para. 4. During the 15 days, the decision to turn back the refugee
candidate is stayed. Id. art. 70bis para. 5.
68. Id. art. 70bis para. 4.
69. The Representative of the UNHCR Commissioner decided which refugee candidates
qualified for refugee status. Decisions denying refugee status could be reopened at any time by
the UNHCR Representative. The role of the UNHCR is discussed, supra, in text
accompanying notes 22-30. Decisions other than those recognizing refugee status were made
by Belgian officials, and could be reviewed through an administrative appeal process. Asylum
in Europe, supra note 15, at 69, 17.
70. Although the presiding judge - unlike the Director of the Office for Refugees and
Stateless Persons - can overrule the denial of entry, the judicial review permitted falls far
short of an adequate check on improper and incorrect decisions at the border. Only those
alleging they are being sent back to a country where they are endangered can file suit, and the
scope of the review is limited to threat to life or liberty. Consequently, there is no inquiry into
the correct application of the criteria that can support a summary denial of entry. Moreover,
the judicial proceeding must be initiated so quickly that it virtually precludes the possibility of
gathering convincing evidence to substantiate the assertions of threat to life or liberty. Thus,
the reviewing court is hampered by the same inadequacy of the record which hampered the
reconsideration of the initial negative decision. This limited judicial review is unsatisfactory.
Its inadequacy is highlighted by the huge expansion in power and discretion of the border
authorities.
71. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 36.
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*to 1987 had a much greater opportunity to obtain legal assistance and
to assist their attorneys in preparing effective cases on their behalf.
b. Penalties on Airlines and Shipping Companies
As troubling as is the broad grant of power to the border police to
refuse entry to refugees, the impact of this legislative change might be
dismissed as irrelevant in light of the potential effect of the new provi-
sion regulating carriers. This feature could, if effective, prevent refu-
gees from ever reaching the borders of Belgium. The law, directed
chiefly at airlines but applicable also to ferry lines, other shipping
companies, and noncommercial ventures, penalizes anyone, public or
private, who brings an alien lacking proper travel documents to
Belgium.7 4 The law is much broader than it first appears because it
imposes fines not only for those passengers who lack documents per-
mitting entry into Belgium, but also for passengers traveling to a third
country who lack documents that the third country may require."
As many international flights schedule layovers at Zaventem Airport
outside Brussels, airline carriers are at great risk under this law.
A much more powerful threat to many carriers than the fine is the
provision allowing seizure of the vessel that carried the passengers
with improper travel documents.7 6 Although the law includes proce-
dures by which the seizure may be challenged and lifted, ' these are of
little consolation to commercial air companies who lose a substantial
amount of money whenever their planes are grounded. Therefore,
airlines flying to or through Belgium now have a huge financial incen-
74. Law of Dec. 15, 1980, art. 74, 1980 Moniteur Beige at 14,604 as amended by Law of
July 14, 1987, art. 17, 1987 Moniteur Beige at 11,118 (adding arts. 74/2-74/4) (subsequent
citations are to revised article numbers). This revision adds a new title regarding the
obligations of those who transport aliens to Belgium. The first provision of this new title
imposes fines on public companies or private individuals who bring five or more aliens lacking
prescribed travel documents by air or sea to Belgium. Id. art. 74/2, § ler. The fine is 1,000
Belgian Francs (about U.SS25) per person transported to Belgium. Id. For purposes of the
fine, immediate relatives (spouses and direct kin) are not counted as additional persons. Id.
art. 74/2, § 1", 49. In addition, a carrier that does not have registered offices or a residence in
Belgium is required to deposit 100,000 Belgian Francs (approximately U.SS2,500) for each
person lacking proper travel documents. Id. art. 74/3; see also Arr.t6 Royal du 10 aofit 1987,
[Royal Degree of Aug. 10, 1987]. 1987 Moniteur Beige 12,206 (fixing amount of fine at
100,000 Francs).
75. Id. art. 74/2, § ler, 3* and 4*.
76. Id. art. 74/3, § 2. The legislation authorizes the government to hold, at the owner's
risk, the means of transport on which the infraction occurred for 96 hours until a sum covering
costs, penalties, and storage is deposited. Id. art. 74/3, § 3. If the owner fails to make
payment within 96 hours, the government may seize the vessel. Id. § 3.
77. Id. art. 74/3, §§ 3-8.
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tive to remove from their planes all passengers whose travel docu-
ments raise even the slightest doubt.
B. Denmark
1. Entry for Asylum-Seekers
The Danish legislation enacted in 198378 has often been praised for
its solicitude toward refugees.79 As in Belgium prior to 1987, Den-
mark permitted an asylum-seeker at the border claiming refugee sta-
tus to enter and remain while a decision was made concerning his
claim."0 Critics of this liberal refugee policy asserted that Denmark
would soon be flooded with refugees. Indeed, the number of refugee
claims filed in Denmark increased dramatically in the years following
the 1983 legislation. Refugee applications rose from 800 in 1983 to
4,300 in 1984, and 8,700 in 1985.81 The Danish government reacted
quickly to the increasing number of asylum-seekers entering Den-
mark, and sought more restrictive legislation. 2 This action reflected
growing public concern over the number of refugees entering the
country. Although only 30,000 refugees had come to Denmark in the
prior three decades, public opinion polls revealed that the average
Danish citizen believed that 100,000 to one million refugees were liv-
ing in Denmark. 83
2. Recent Legislation
In response to these concerns, the Danish Parliament amended the
1983 legislation three times.84 Each time, the Parliament imposed
greater barriers to entry.8 5 Consequently, the Aliens Act, as last
amended in 1986, is among the most restrictive in Europe.86 The Act
precludes an individual arriving at the border without a passport and
visa or other proper travel documents from entering the country in
order to process a claim for refugee status 7.8  Although appeals of
78. Udlaendingeloven [The Aliens Act], Act No. 226, June 8, 1983 (as amended by Act No.
232, June 6, 1985; Act No. 574, Dec. 19, 1985; and Act No. 686, Oct. 17, 1986).
79. See, e.g., Lamb, supra note 55, at 9.
80. Id. at 9-10; Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 103, 7.
81. Lamb, supra note 55, at 10. Applications further increased in 1986 to 9,300. Id.
82. Id. at 9-10.
83. Id. at 10.
84. See Act No. 232, June 6, 1985; Act No. 574, Dec. 19, 1985; Act No. 686, Oct. 17, 1986.
85. See Lamb, supra note 55, at 10.
86. Id. The Danish parliament considered the Aliens Act again in 1987, but decided not to
revise the legislation. See Letter from Gunnar Homann, Attorney (Aug. 18, 1988) [hereinafter
Homann Letter] (Copy on file at the offices of the Virginia Journal of International Law).
87. Aliens Act § 28(1)(i).
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-decisions denying entry are still possible, the refugee candidate must
remain outside Denmark during the process."" In addition, the gov-
ernment may impose fines on carriers bringing to the country aliens
lacking proper entry documents.8 9 Several provisions of the 1986 leg-
islation follow the trend in northern Europe of restricting the caravan
of asylum seekers.
a. Authority to Border Police
In Denmark, as in Belgium, the new legislation places exceptional
power in the hands of the border police. The Aliens Act authorizes
the border police to deny entry to aliens at the border under the fol-
lowing six circumstances:
1. The alien lacks the necessary passport and visa that permit
entry into Denmark;9
2. The alien has previously been expelled and forbidden to re-
enter Denmark;91
3. The alien intends to stay or work in Denmark without proper
authorization;92
4. The alien is not financially independent in Denmark and can-
not pay for the return home;93
5. The alien would be a threat to public order, security, or
health;94 or
6. The alien is a threat to national security.95
i. Border Proceedings
The 1986 amendments did not modify the preceding grounds for
denial of entry. Instead they changed the procedure at the border so
as virtually to preclude the admission of all asylum-seekers. A refu-
gee or asylum-seeker requesting entry at the Danish border or at an
88. Id. §§ 46(2), 48(2).
89. Id. § 59(3).
90. Id. § 28(1)Cii) (prohibits entry of aliens lacking the required passport and visa for
entering Denmark). Generally, all aliens are required to have visas allowing entry and stay in
Denmark. Id. § 4(1). However, aliens from the four other Nordic countries (Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden) and the eleven other countries of the European Economic Community
(EEC) may enter without visas. Id. §§ 1-2.
91. Id. § 28(l)(i). If the alien possesses a visa that permits re-entry despite the earlier
prohibition, he may enter. Id. § 32.
92. Id. § 28(1)(iii).
93. Id. § 28(I)(iv). This prohibition does not apply to nationals of EEC countries. Id.
94. Id. § 28(1)(v).
95. Id. § 28(3).
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airport must produce a valid passport and visa. 96 A refugee lacking
these documents may ask the border police to admit him or her in
order to apply for asylum in Denmark. Under the new procedure the
border police then telephone the Directorate for Aliens, which
decides, based on the information relayed by the border police,
whether to admit the asylum-seeker.97 The Directorate generally
refuses to consider the merits of the asylum request at this time,
focusing instead on the refugee's request to enter Denmark. 98 As a
result, many asylum-seekers are denied entry at the border.99 More-
over, they lack an opportunity to present a well-developed, compel-
ling case for refugee status in their initial encounter with the border
police.
Arguably, the new Danish procedure is superior to the Belgian leg-
islation because it contains a safeguard against erroneous decisions by
the border police. The police, presented with a request for asylum,
must telephone the Directorate of Aliens, the government agency that
ordinarily determines claims to refugee status. Thus, the office
responsible for resolving refugee claims, rather than the law enforce-
ment arm of the government, technically makes the entry decision.
This safeguard is illusory. Although the Directorate of Aliens rather
than the border police decides entry requests, this decision is based
only on what the border police relay after a cursory examination of
the asylum-seeker's request. 1°° Furthermore, the Directorate of
Aliens divorces the merits of the asylum claim from the request to
enter. Because most refugees lack the formal documents required for
entry,1°  an initial negative decision on an asylum-seeker's request to
96. Aliens Act § 28(1)(i). Because individuals from EEC countries and other Nordic
countries need not present visas, asylum-seekers from any of those countries can enter
Denmark without travel documents. Id §§ 1-2.
97. G. Homann, Denmark Country Report, The Second European Hearings on the Right
to Asylum I (Mar. 6, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Homann Report] (Copy on
file at the offices of the Virginia Journal of International Law). The Direktoratet for
Udlaendinge (Directorate for Aliens) is an administrative body charged with determining
refugee status. See Aliens Act § 46(1) (providing that decisions pursuant to the Act be made
by the Directorate for Aliens). Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act specifically provide for
decisions about refugee status and asylum in Denmark. Id. §§ 7(1), (2).
98. Aliens Act § 48(2), states: "An application for a residence permit under the rules in
sections 7 or 8 [regarding refugees and asylum-seekers similar to refugees] shall not be treated
till it has been decided whether the alien in question shall be denied entry or expelled ... and
has left the country." See also Homann Report, supra note 97, at 1.
99. Lamb, supra note 55, at 10. Between October 1986 and June 1987 Denmark admitted
only 850 individuals who sought asylum at the border. Id. But see number of asylum-seekers
allowed to enter Denmark, Jan.-Aug., 1988, infra note 114.
100. See Homann Report, supra note 97, at 1.
101. Asylum-seekers lacking proper travel documents are rejected at the border even
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-enter Denmark is often a foregone conclusion.
There are certain limits on denial of entry to undocumented asy-
lum-seekers. The Danish legislation includes a provision forbidding
expulsion of aliens to countries in which they risk persecution or to
countries which will, in turn, deport the aliens to a country in which
they risk persecution.102 Accordingly, some asylum-seekers lacking
proper documents are allowed to enter Denmark. 0 3 Yet, this protec-
tion, more limited than it seems, results in a great many anomalous
decisions. This legislative scheme, combined with the realities of
international transportation, places great emphasis on the route taken
by the asylum-seeker. The denial of entry generally results in the
return of the alien to the country from which he most recently
departed.1 4 Consequently, an individual fleeing persecution who
makes his way directly to Denmark will be allowed to enter, but his
compatriot who flees the same persecution but stops en route in
another country - no matter how briefly - will be refused entry if
though they are able to prove they risk persecution in their country of origin and have close
ties to Denmark. Homarn Letter, supra note 86, at 3. Thus, although they ultimately will
prevail on their asylum claim, they are forced to leave Denmark and apply from abroad. The
Danish procedure for applying for asylum from abroad is discussed, infra, notes 113-25 and
accompanying text.
102. Section 8 of Act No. 686 of Oct. 17, 1986 modifies section 48(2) of the Aliens Act to
read:
Where an alien claims to fall within the provisions of Sections 7 and 8. the decision
on denial of entry shall be made by the Directorate for Aliens pursuant to the rules in
Part V. An application for Danish residence permit under the provisions of Sections
7 and 8 shall not be considered until (a) it has been decided whether the alien
concerned shall be denied entry or be expelled under the provisions of Sections 24(v)
and (b) the alien concerned has left Denmark. The alien concerned shall however
not be deported to a country where there is a risk of persecution on the grounds
referred to in the Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, 28th July 1951.
Article IA, or where there is no protection against further deportation of the alien to
such country. Decision on expulsion shall be made by the Directorate for Miens.
Where a decision on denial of entry or on expulsion and deportation is made by the
Directorate, appeal against such decision shall lie to the Minister of Justice, cf.
Section 46(2). Such appeal made to the Minister of Justice shall not have suspensive
effect. If the Directorate for Aliens makes no decision on denial of entry or on
expulsion and deportation, the alien shall be notified of the possibility of contacting
the Danish Refugee Council.
Id.
103. Those asylum-seekers allowed to enter pursuant to Section 48(2) of the Danish Aliens
Act are entitled to present their claims for refugee status in the same manner as other aliens
who entered Denmark with proper documents. Homann Letter, supra note 86, at 2.
104. The Convention on International Civil Aviation provides: "Upon refusal of admission
and transfer back of any person, the operator shall be responsible for promptly returning him
to the point where he commenced the use of the operator's aircraft or to any other place where
the person is admissible." Convention on International Civil Aviation. Dec. 7, 1944. Annex 9,
Standard 3.35, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No. 487. 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
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that intermediate country is deemed free from persecution.105 Thus,
an asylum-seeker from Turkey who spent two hours in transit in an
airport in the Federal Republic of Germany would be refused entry,
whereas a Turkish asylum-seeker who flew directly to Denmark
would be admitted. 1°6
More troubling, however, is the determination by Denmark of
"safe" countries. The Directorate for Aliens decides which countries
are "safe" for asylum-seekers. 0 7 A "safe" country is one that will
neither persecute the asylum-seeker nor send him on to a country
where he risks persecution. It should provide a "genuine state of
security" for the asylum-seeker. 108 An asylum-seeker from a "safe"
country or who has traveled through a "safe" country will not be
allowed to enter Denmark. Instead, he will be returned to the "safe"
country. Currently, asylum-seekers lacking the proper documents
who arrive from Canada, the United States, or any of the Western
European countries are rejected at the border, no matter what their
country of origin nor how tenuous their connection with the "safe"
country. 09
Although the legislation precludes return of an asylum-seeker to a
country that might deport him to his country of origin where he risks
persecution, the Danish authorities do not seek any guarantees from
an intermediate "safe" country that it will allow the asylum-seeker to
stay there. 110 Instead, the Danish officials rely on the fact that gener-
ally the transit countries are signatories of the Geneva Convention
and thus are obligated to refrain from returning asylum-seekers to
countries in which they will be persecuted."'I Unfortunately, in deal-
ing with asylum-seekers, theory and practice often diverge. In fact,
the "safe" countries often have different opinions as to which other
countries may be "safe" for an asylum-seeker." 12 As a consequence,
105. As mentioned earlier, supra note 98, the merits of the asylum claim are not considered.
Thus, an asylum-seeker entitled under § 7(4) of the Aliens Act to reside in Denmark will be
rejected if he lacks the proper travel documents and travelled through a "safe" country. He
will be forced to apply for asylum from abroad. Homann Letter, supra note 86, at 3.
106. Homann Letter, supra note 86, at 2.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Castellani, supra note 55, at 31.
109. Letter from Eva Kjaergaard, Legal Advisor, Danish Refugee Council (Sept. 1, 1988)
[hereinafter Kjaergaard Letter] (Copy on file at the offices of the Virginia Journal of
International Law); Homann Letter, supra note 86, at 3.
110. Homann Letter, supra note 86, at 3.
111. Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits returning refugees to countries
where their lives or freedom would be threatened. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7.
See also discussion infra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
112. Castellani, supra note 55, at 31.
[Vol. 29:33
1988] RESTRICTING ASYLUM-SEEKERS
Danish border guards may turn an asylum-seeker back to an interme-
diate "safe" country, which in turn sends him on to a country which
the Danish authorities deem "unsafe." Thus, Danish authorities
accomplish indirectly what they are prohibited from doing directly.'1 3
In the future, similar "mistakes" are bound to recur. These mis-
takes undercut the protection that the Danish legislation in theory
affords to asylum-seekers. 1 4 As a consequence, the need for an effec-
tive appeal from rejection at the border is great.
ii. Lack of Effective Appeal
Danish law provides that an individual denied entry at the border
may ask the Minister of Justice to reconsider this negative decision. 5
The asylum-seeker must leave Denmark immediately, however, and
await the Minister of Justice's decision elsewhere.' t6 Consequently,
the asylum-seeker's ability to prepare an adequate request for recon-
sideration is limited. In most cases this places an insuperable burden
113. For example, the Danish policy is that Iranian asylum-seekers cannot be returned to
Turkey, because they risk deportation from Turkey to Iran. Homan Letter, supra note 86, at
3. Nonetheless, Iranian asylum-seekers who travelled to Denmark through Turkey and the
Federal Republic of Germany have been rejected at the Danish border and returned to the
Federal Republic. The Federal Republic then returned them to Turkey. By pushing these
Iranian asylum-seekers back to the Federal Republic without any guarantees that the Federal
Republic would allow them to enter or that, at least, the Federal Republic would not send
them on to an "unsafe" country such as Turkey, the Danish legislation forbidding expulsion to
unsafe countries was eviscerated. Id. For other examples, see Castellani, supra note 55, at 32-
33.
114. From January 1, 1988 to August 14, 1988, 722 asylum-seekers were rejected at the
Danish border and returned to the country from which they came. During the same period,
2,540 asylum-seekers were allowed to enter Denmark. Those allowed to enter fell into the
following categories: (1) asylum-seekers arriving directly from countries in which they fear
persecution, (2) asylum-seekers who travelled through an intermediate country in Eastern
Europe (Eastern European countries deemed "unsafe"), (3) unaccompanied minors,
(4) asylum-seekers who have destroyed travel documents and other proof of travel route to
prevent the authorities from determining the countries to which they should be returned, and
(5) asylum-seekers with proper travel documents. Homann Letter, supra note 86, at 3-4.
115. The Aliens Act § 46(2), provides that decisions of the Directorate for Aliens may
generally be appealed to the Minister of Justice. Section 48(2) of the Act further specifies that
decisions concerning denial of entry to asylum-seekers shall be appealed to the Minister of
Justice in accordance with § 46(2). Although § 53(a) provides for certain appeals from the
Directorate for Aliens to another administrative body known as the Refugee Board, such
appeals pertain only to residence permits and travel documents, not to denials of entry. Id.
§ 53a(l). See also Homann Report, supra note 97, at 1.
116. Aliens Act § 48(2), specifies that appeals of denials of entry to asylum-seekers "shall
not suspend the operation of an administrative decision." However, an alien shall not be
expelled to a country in which the alien risks being persecuted on the grounds set forth in
Article IA of the Convention on Status of Refugees, or where the alien will not be protected
from such expulsion. Id. See also Homann Report, supra note 97, at 1.
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on the refugee's Danish advocate. The Belgian legislation, which
allows reconsideration prior to departure, is superior to Danish law in
at least this respect.' 17
More significantly, however, the scope of the review on appeal is
exceedingly narrow in light of the bifurcation of the entry and asylum
request. The legal issue under reconsideration is the asylum-seeker's
entitlement to enter Denmark." 8 Because the asylum-seeker in most
cases lacks the requisite entry documents, he will not be able to prove
that he was technically entitled to enter. In reality, the error that the
asylum-seeker is protesting is not the incorrect evaluation of his entry
documents, but rather the denial of the opportunity to enter Denmark
and show that he is entitled to asylum under Danish law." 9 This
error, however, is not cognizable on appeal. 120
117. Furthermore, although an asylum-seeker can seek reconsideration of a negative
decision on entry, the reconsideration process lacks the indicia of an appeals procedure aimed
at rooting out error. The appeal is to the same government agency that made the original
decision.
118. See Aliens Act § 48(2) ("If the Directorate for Aliens makes a decision as regards
denial of entry or expulsion, the decision can be appealed against to the Minister of Justice.").
119. On occasion, an asylum-seeker denied entry at the border may seek to show that the
Danish authorities violated § 48(2) of the Aliens Act by returning him to an unsafe country.
The fact that he is able to present an appeal from this "unsafe" country to some extent
undercuts his argument.
120. This procedure that denies entry without closely examining the merits of the asylum
claim reveals the exceedingly restrictive effect of the 1986 legislation. Yet Danish law
continues to maintain adequate procedures for determining asylum applications filed by
asylum-seekers who have already entered Denmark. For example, sections 53 to 58 of the
Aliens Act establish elaborate procedures for review of decisions made by the Directorate for
Aliens concerning refugee status. These procedures include review by a Refugee Board
composed of judges and other members nominated by the Danish Refugee Council and
government ministers. Aliens Act § 53(1). The appellant may plead his case orally before the
Board, id. § 56(1), may be represented by a lawyer, id. § 55(l), and may have a lawyer
appointed with costs paid by the government. Id. § 58.
In addition the Danish law provides that a refugee who is unable to meet the precise
elements of the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention (Convention-status or K-
status) may still be deemed a refugee if he can show "reasons similar to those listed in the
Convention or ... other weighty reasons" that preclude returning the asylum-seeker to his
home country (de facto-status or F-status). Id. § 7(2). Furthermore, the law allows that a
residence permit may be granted to an alien who lacks close connections to Denmark if
"essential considerations of a humanitarian nature ... make it appropriate," id. § 9(2)(ii) or
"exceptional reasons otherwise make it appropriate." Id. § 9(2)(iv).
Danish law also mandates generous assistance to those aliens in Denmark whose asylum
applications are pending. Section 42a of the Aliens Act provides that asylum-seekers in
Denmark who have applied for refugee or de facto refugee status shall receive financial
assistance, if needed, from the Directorate for Aliens. See Lamb, supra note 55, at 11 ("Once a
refugee has been granted status .... they have the right to work, public welfare assistance, full
access to the Danish school system and may even vote in local elections."). However, Danish
law now makes it practically impossible for asylum-seekers to enter Denmark and avail
themselves of these procedures.
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Furthermore, there is no possibility of judicial review of the deci-
sion of the Minister of Justice. If the Minister of Justice upholds the
refusal of entry, no appeal is possible. In theory, at least, another
avenue of relief is available. The law allows an asylum-seeker to apply
for asylum at a Danish consulate abroad. 2 This procedure is not,
however, as generous as it may appear at first glance. To be granted
asylum in Denmark from abroad, an asylum-seeker must satisfy more
stringent requirements than had he entered Denmark and filed his
asylum application there. If he applies while he is in Denmark, he
must show only that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in his
country of origin, 1 22 or that he can demonstrate other weighty reasons
why he should not be returned to his homeland.' 23 For an applicant
from abroad, proving a well-founded fear of persecution or other
weighty reasons for remaining away from his country of origin is not
enough. He must also demonstrate that his relationship to Denmark
is closer than his relation to any other country. ' 2  Thus, as a practical
matter, only an asylum-seeker who has close relatives already living in
Denmark'" or has himself previously lived in Denmark in a lawful
status has any hope of successfully applying for refugee status
abroad,- 6 no matter how compelling his claim.' 27
121. Aliens Act § 7(4); Homann Report, supra note 97, at 1-2. See Danish officials will give
an asylum-seeker rejected at the border a list of Danish consulates and written guidelines on
filing asylum applications abroad. Id.
122. The Aliens Act provides that residence permits shall be issued to aliens who fall within
the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. Aliens Act § 7(1).
The Convention recognizes as refugees those who are outside their country of nationality face
a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of nationality based on race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 1951 Refugee
Convention, supra note 7, art. I.A.(2).
123. The Aliens Act § 7(2) expressly provides that residence permits shall also be issued to
aliens who do not satisfy the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of refugee, but who, "for
reasons similar to those listed in the Convention or for other weighty reasons ... ought not to
be required to return to his home country." Id.
124. The Aliens Act § 7(4) provides that an alien outside Denmark who qualifies as a
refugee or defacto refugee under subsections 7(1) and 7(2) may receive a residence permit "if
because of the alien's previous prolonged stay in Denmark, or close relatives living in Denmark
or of other relationship, Denmark [is] deemed to be the country nearest to affording protection
to that alien." See also Homann Report, supra note 97, at 2. This "close relationship"
requirement is not applied to an asylum-seeker in Denmark requesting refugee status. Instead,
such claims are evaluated only to determine if they satisfy the definition of refugee set forth in
the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, or the legislative criteria set forth for defacto
refugee status, discussed supra note 120.
125. It may be insufficient to have a brother or sister living in Denmark if the asylum-
seeker's relationship with his sibling is not a close one. M. Kjaerum, An Asylum Seeker's Way
Through the System 10 (1988).
126. Id.
127. Even an asylum-seeker with relatives in Denmark does not fare well in an application
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Similarly, the possibility of appeal of the denial of an application
submitted from abroad is severely limited. An application for asylum
received from a Danish consulate abroad is sent through the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs to the Directorate of Aliens.1 28 Negative decisions
by the Directorate of Aliens can be appealed to the Refugee Appeals
Board. 129  If the asylum-seeker has relatives living in Denmark or
other close links to Denmark, the Appeals Board will appoint a law-
yer to represent him. 130 Few asylum-seekers have such ties. 1 3  Even
those who do and who have lawyers appointed rarely have a chance
to meet or correspond with their attorneys.13 2 Consequently, most
appeals are based solely on the written record below 33 and are unsuc-
from abroad. The relative living in Denmark must be a close relative; even a brother or sister
may not suffice if the sibling relationship has not been a close one. Id.
Once the family hurdle is cleared, the asylum-seeker still faces many obstacles. He will
generally be applying for asylum at a Danish consulate that is not located in his home country.
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, defines a refugee as one "outside
the country of his nationality" or "not having a nationality and ... ., outside the country of his
former habitual residence." See Kjaergaard, the "New" Asylum Rule and its Implementation,
in Current Asylum Policy and Humanitarian Principles 21, 24-25 (1988). He will probably
not speak either Danish or the language of the local consulate employees and will thus have
difficulty in obtaining advice about the asylum application and complying with the required
procedures. Kjaergaard, supra, at 25.
In addition to the lack of interpreters, the asylum-seeker will face other problems.
Consulate personnel are understaffed and untrained in refugee law. The asylum-seeker may
fear disclosing to government officials details of the activity that triggered persecution by
public officials in his home country. Moreover, if he applies for asylum in a country
neighboring his own, he may also fear that local authorities will notify his home country of the
asylum application and even repatriate him as a diplomatic gesture of good will. An asylum-
seeker who overcomes these fears may well have difficulty expressing himself in writing. Id.
His relatives in Denmark may also be uneducated and unsophisticated and unable to provide
guidance. Even if the relative in Denmark is educated and eager to help, he is not allowed to
act on behalf of the asylum-seeker without written authorization. Id. at 26. All in all, the
avenue of applying from abroad is a narrow one.
128. Id. The Directorate of Aliens estimates that it has received 4,000 applications from
abroad since the 1986 amendment to the Aliens Act; approximately 2,000 of those applications
have been filed in Lebanon by stateless Palestinians. Id. at 23.
129. Id. The Refugees Appeal Board is an administrative body with 7 members. The
chairman must be a judge. The Minister of Justice, the Minister for Social Welfare, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Bar Association each nominate one member. The Danish
Refugee Council nominates the other two members. Kjaerum, supra note 125, at 13. The
Directorate of Aliens estimates that since the 1986 Amendment to the Aliens Act it has
granted 50 applications and denied 1,700 applications from abroad. Kjaergaard, supra note
127, at 29.
130. Kjaergaard, supra note 127, at 26. Over 90% of appeals without a lawyer are rejected
by the Refugee Appeals Board.
131. Id.
132. Kjaergaard, supra note 127, at 26.
133. Id.
RESrRICTING ASYLUM-SEEKERS
•cessful. 134 There is no administrative or judicial review of negative
decisions of the Refugee Appeals Board. 135
In sum, the 1986 grant of authority to the border police to reject
asylum-seekers at the border and at airports, coupled with the restric-
tive technical approach to reviewing denials of entry, the lack of judi-
cial review, and the inadequacies of filing an asylum application from
abroad, has dramatically decreased the number of asylum-seekers in
Denmark.
b. Penalties on Airlines and Shipping Companies
In addition to revising the entry procedures, the 1986 legislation
explicitly provides penalties for persons bringing aliens without
proper travel documents to Denmark. 36 The offending carriers are
strictly liable and can be fined even if they were totally unaware that a
passenger lacked a valid passport and visa.1 37 Under this provision
the Minister of Justice has the authority to specify sanctions against
carriers that transport asylum-seekers who lack valid passports and
entry visas to Denmark. 38 Interestingly, the Minister of Justice has
not yet set forth regulations detailing the applicable sanctions. None-
theless, the very fact that the Minister has the explicit power to estab-
lish penalties against transporters has had a powerful effect.1 39 Air
carriers, in particular have become extremely restrictive, prohibiting
aliens who lack entry permits from boarding airplanes bound for
Denmark. 14°
Indeed, the Danish experience highlights the power of financial
penalties on private companies. The law accomplishes its purpose -
preventing most incompletely documented aliens from boarding Den-
mark-bound vehicles - even though it has not been implemented. A
134. The Refugee Board estimates that since the 1986 amendment to the Aliens Act it has
received 150 appeals of asylum applications filed abroad. It has decided approximately 40
cases and rejected most of them. Kjaergaard, supra note 127, at 29.
135. Id. at 15.
136. The 1986 amendment, Act No. 686 of Oct. 17, 1986, added a new final paragraph to
section 59 of the Aliens Act: "With penalty shall be punished any person who brings to this
country an alien who upon his entry is not in possession of requisite travel permit and visa
..... Aliens Act § 59(3).
137. M. Kjaerum, supra note 125, at 11.
138. Homann Report, supra note 97, at 6.
139. See id. ('[The mere existence of the rule has made the carriers more reluctant to
transport passengers without proper travel documents.").
140. Id. Interview with Gunnar Homann, Attorney, in Copenhagen, Denmark (July 17.
1987); see also Lamb, supra note 55, at 10 (Since I January this year, fewer than 25 per cent
of the 235 rejected cases were turned away at the airport, suggesting that the airlines have
taken the threat seriously and are applying controls themselves.").
1988]
64 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:33
mere threat is sufficient. As a result, most asylum-seekers never even
reach Danish borders or airports where they can at least apply for
asylum and hope for a sympathetic hearing.
C. The Federal Republic of Germany
1. Entry for Asylum-Seekers
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees
political refugees asylum in Germany.1 41 This constitutional guaran-
tee, extensively interpreted and developed by the German courts, is
supplemented by legislation regulating the admission of asylum-seek-
ers and the recognition of those who qualify as political refugees.1 42
Prior to 1987 an asylum-seeker entering the Federal Republic legally
or illegally began the asylum process by applying to the local aliens
police for refugee status and asylum.1 43 An alien stopped at the bor-
der who lacked the necessary visa and other travel documents could
apply for asylum to the border police. 1" The border police generally
referred the informal asylum application to the local aliens police and
allowed the asylum-seeker to enter the country. In certain circum-
stances, however, the border police could deny entry and refuse to
refer the asylum request to the aliens police. 145 If the border police
believed the asylum-seeker had already found protection from perse-
141. Grundgesetz [GG], art. 16, § 2 ("Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy
the right to asylum.").
142. Gesetz fiber das Asylverfahren vom 16 Juli 1982 [Law of July 16, 1982 on Asylum
Procedure], 1982 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 946. The Asylverfahrensgesetz (AsylVfG)
[Asylum Procedure Law] is the basic legislative act regulating the procedures by which
asylum-seekers may enter and seek refugee status in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is
roughly analogous to the Refugee Act of 1980 in the United States.
The Asylum Procedure Law of July 16, 1982 was modified by legislation passed on July 11,
1984. See Gesetz vom 11 Juli 1984, 1984 BGBI.I 874. It was further modified on January 6,
1987. See Gesetz zur Anderung asylverfahrensrechtlicher, arbeitserlaubnisrechtlicher und
ausl~inderrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 6. Januar 1987 [Law of January 6, 1987 to amend the
process governing asylum, work permits, and aliens], 1987 BGBI.I 89.
143. AsylVfG § 8(1), 1982 BGBI.I at 947. An alien must file his asylum application with
the Ausldnderbehdrde (aliens police) located in the district where the alien resides. Although
the ultimate decision on recognition as a refugee is made by the Bundesverwaltung (federal
authorities), the initial applications and matters concerning social assistance are handled by
the Ldnderverwaltung (state authorities). Each Land (state) has its own aliens police. Id.; see
also Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 154-55, 15-16 (describing initial application
procedure).
144. AsylVfG § 9(l), 1982 BGBI.I at 947. Section 9(1) provides that an asylum-seeker who
makes known his asylum claim to the Grenzbehdrde (border police) should be referred to the
competent aliens police for further developing the request. See also Asylum in Europe, supra
note 15, at 155, 1 16-17.
145. AsylVfG §§ 9(l), 7(2)-(3), 1982 BGBI.I at 947. Section 9(1) refers to sections 7(2) and
7(3), and provides that an asylum-seeker should be denied entry if he already found protection
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-cution in another country before he attempted to come to Ger-
many,' 46 the police could refuse entry altogether. 4 In addition, the
Federal Republic had concluded reciprocal agreements with nine
neighboring countries regulating the flow of asylum-seekers, and the
border police relied on these agreements to turn away many asylum-
seekers at the border.'48
An asylum-seeker authorized to enter the Federal Republic in
order to seek recognition as a refugee was required to initiate the for-
mal asylum process by filing an application with the aliens police.4
9
The aliens police denied all applications where the Federal Republic
had previously denied the asylum claim and the circumstances had
not changed, 5' and where the applicant had previously secured pro-
elsewhere or carried a travel document indicating that he had been recognized as a refugee by
another country. Id.
146. See AsylVfG § 2, 1987 BGB1.I at 946 ( referring to anderweitiger Schutz Vor
Verfolgung (protection elsewhere)). Under the 1982 law, aliens who had already found
protection from persecution in another country had no right to asylum. Id. Protection from
persecution was defined not only as freedom from persecution in another country, but also as
freedom from fear of deportation to a country where there is a threat of political persecution.
Id. Compare simila provision under Danish law, supra notes 102-113 and accompanying text.
147. For example, a country that has signed the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees is required to issue to a refugee lawfully staying within its territory a
Convention Travel Document, which provides the refugee with a passport substitute and
permits him to travel to other countries. (A sample travel document is annexed to the 1951
Refugee Convention.) 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 28. Thus, an asylum-
seeker carrying a Convention Travel Document would be presumed to have found protection
from persecution in the country that issued the Document and, consequently, would not be
permitted to enter the Federal Republic to apply for asylum. AsylVfG § 7(3), 1982 BGBI.I at
947 (providing that an alien who bears a travel document issued by another country in
recognition of the alien's status as a refugee is deemed to have already found protection in that
country). See Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 155, 17. An individual traveling on a
Convention Travel Document to the Federal Republic for non-asylum reasons would be
allowed entry provided he had a visa issued by the Federal Republic. A Convention Travel
Document and visa should thus be sufficient to allow the bearer to enter the Federal Republic
for business, tourist, or family reasons. Telephone Interview with Rudolf Klever, Member,
Steering Committee, European Legal Network on Asylum (Feb. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Klever
Interview].
148. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 156, 21. These agreements bind Austria,
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Denmark
to take back asylum-seekers who have left their borders to seek asylum in the Federal
Republic. They apply both to asylum-seekers who have only briefly passed through the
countries and to those who have been present for a longer time. Klever Interview, supra note
147. Because the agreements are reciprocal, the countries in question also return to the
Federal Republic many asylum-seekers who have passed through the Federal Republic en
route to the country where they have applied for asylum. See, e.g., Refugees, June 1987, at 10.
149. AsylVfG § 8(1), 1982 BGBl.I at 947; Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 155, f 18.
150. AsylVfG § 14, 1982 BGBI.I at 948 (forbiding consideration of new asylum
applications based upon evidence presented in a previously denied application); Asylum in
Europe, supra note 15, at 155, 18.
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tection from persecution in another country. 5' If neither of these fac-
tors was present, the aliens police sent the asylum application, along
with a report of the preliminary interview, 52 to the Federal Office for
the Recognition of Foreign Refugees. 5 3
The Federal Office then interviewed the applicant more exten-
sively. "54 During this interview the asylum-seeker had the right to the
presence of an attorney and an interpreter of his choice.'55 A staff
member of the Federal Office prepared a report on the interview. 56
This report along with the earlier report from the aliens police and
other documentary evidence became the record on which the Federal
Office issued a written decision'57 recognizing or denying the appli-
cant's claim.'s A decision granting asylum could be appealed to the
courts by the Federal Commissioner for Asylum Affairs. 59 A deci-
sion denying asylum could be, and often was, appealed to the courts
by the asylum-seeker.160 Filing an appeal stayed all efforts by the gov-
151. AsylVfG § 7(2), 1982 BGBI.I at 947; Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 155, 18(a);
see also AsylVfG § 2, 1982 BGBI.I at 946 (defining "protection elsewhere").
152. AsylVfG § 8(2), 1982 BGBI.I at 947; see also Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 155,
18.
153. AsylVfG § 8(5), 1982 BGBI.I at 947. Section 8(5) requires that the aliens police
transmit the asylum application to the federal agency charged with refugee status decisions,
the Bundesamt fair die Anerkennung ausldndischer Flzfchtlinge (Federal Office for the
Recognition of Foreign Refugees). See Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 155, 18.
154. AsylVfG § 12, 1982 BGBI.I at 948 (providing that an asylum-seeker have a hearing
before the Federal Office); Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 156, 22.
155. AsylVfG § 8(4), 1982 BGBI.I at 947; Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 156, 23.
156. AsylVfG § 12(l), 1982 BGBI.I at 948; see also Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at
156, 24.
157. AsylVfG § 12(6), 1982 BGBI.I at 948 (requiring a written decision); Asylum in
Europe, supra note 15, at 156, 25.
158. AsylVfG § 4(1), 1982 BGBI.I at 946. The Federal Office has the power to make all
decisions concerning asylum applications pursuant to the Asylum Protection law of 1982. Id.
159. AsylVfG § 5(2), 1982 BGBl.I at 946 (authorizing the Bundesbeauftragter fair
Asylangelegenheiten (Federal Commissioner for Asylum Affairs) to appeal decisions by the
Federal Office); Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 157, 29. Decisions granting asylum to
applicants from Eastern European countries were rarely appealed. The vast majority of
decisions granting asylum to applicants from non-Eastern European countries were appealed
by the Federal Commissioner. Klever Interview, supra note 147.
160. AsylVfG §§ 28(1), 30. 1982 BGBI.I at 951; see also Asylum in Europe, supra note 15,
at 157-58, 7 31-33. Some asylum-seekers who receive a negative decision from the Federal
Office are allowed to remain in the Federal Republic based on humanitarian grounds. Each ofthe Ldnder (states) sets its own policy as to %lI roups of asylum-seekers may remain. For
example, all of the states except Baden-Wiirttemburg and Bavaria have issued directives
allowing Tamils to remain despite negative decisions on their asylum applications by the
Federal Office. Such asylum-seekers generally do not appeal. Klever Interview, supra note
147.
For asylum-seekers not allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds, a denial of asylum by
the Federal Office leads to an order issued by the aliens police to the asylum-seeker to leave the
RESTRICTING ASYLUM-SEEKERS
ernment to expel the asylum-seeker.1 61  The appeals process itself
could take many years.1 62  Thus, the incentive to appeal a negative
asylum decision was great.
During the 1980's the number of asylum-seekers in the Federal
Republic increased dramatically. Asylum applications increased from
35,728 in 1984 to 73,832 in 1985 and 99,650 in 1986.163 Public dis-
country. AsylVfG § 28(1). AsylVfG § 30 provides that the asylum-seeker must challenge
both the Federal Office's denial of asylum and the aliens police's order to leave the country in
one judicial proceeding. Id.
If the Federal Office rejects the asylum application as "offensichtlich unbegrindet"
(manifestly unfounded), the applicant is given one month to challenge the decision in a
Beschwerde (summary proceeding) before the local Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court).
Filing this challenge does not stay the deportation order. Id. § 11(2), 1982 BGBII at 948.
Rather, within one week of the negative decision from the Federal Office, the asylum-seeker
must separately file an application with the court seeking to suspend the effect of the order.
Verwaltungsgerichtsordung (VWGO) [Rules of the Administrative Courts] § 80, § V, 1986
BGBl.I 2191. If he fails to seek a stay of the Federal Office's decision, the aliens police may
deport him - despite the fact that the one month deadline for seeking review of the decision
may not yet have expired or, if he has already sought review of the decision, despite the fact
that a challenge is pending.
If the Court finds that the application is manifestly unfounded, no further appeal is allowed.
AsylVfG § 32(6), 1982 BGBI. at 952; Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 157-58, j 32-33;
see also id. at 155-56, 19. An asylum-seeker can, however, seek an injunction from the
highest court or Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) by arguing that the
denial of his asylum claim violates the constitutional guarantee of asylum to victims of political
persecution. The Federal Constitutional Court only rarely provides relief in asylum cases.
During the months (often two or three) the asylum-seeker awaits the decision of the
Constitutional Court, he is in a "tolerated" status and will not be deported. Letter from
Rudolf Klever, Member, Steering Committee, European Legal Network on Asylum (Sept. 3,
1988) [hereinafter Klever Letter].
If the Court upholds the rejection of the application, but does not find that it is manifestly
unfounded, an appeal is allowed in cases which present important issues of law or which
conflict with higher court decisions. AsylVfG § 32(2), 1982 BGBI.I at 952, see also Asylum in
Europe, supra note 15, at 158, 35. The denial of an appeal can itself be challenged in a
summary proceeding before the Oben'erwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court of Appeals).
AsylVfG § 32(4), 1982 BGBL.I at 952, Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 158, f 36; see
generally id. at 157-58, 32-37; Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref.
183, 209-11 (1984).
161. AsylVfG § 30, 1982 BGBI.I at 951; Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 158, V 38.
Section 11(2) provides, however, that an appeal of the Federal Office's decision that an
application is manifestly unfounded does not suspend expulsion. Id. § 11(2), 1982 BGBI.! at
948. Similarly, an appeal of a denial of asylum based on a finding of protection elsewhere.
supra note 120, possession of refugee status, or subsequent submission of a previously rejected
asylum application without new evidence did not suspend expulsion. Id. § 10(3). 1982 BGBi.
at 947.
162. Avery, supra note 22, at 285 (stating that an appeal could take up to eight years). Se,
also Aleinikoff, supra note 160, at 209 (noting that adjudication process was so lengthy that it
encouraged more asylum-seekers to seek review).
163. Wolken, Country Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, European Consultation
on Refugees and Exiles I (Mar. 9-10, 1987) [hereinafter Wolken Report 1]. The total numbxer
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may, which had been slowly building as the number of applicants
rose, increased to a fever pitch in 1986 due to the manipulation of
asylum-seekers by the authorities of the German Democratic Repub-
lic. The focal point of the crisis was Berlin, which formally is still
occupied by the four victorious Allied Powers of World War II.161
Because Berlin is an occupied city, as a legal matter its sovereignty
lies with neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the German
Democratic Republic, but with the four occupying countries. 165 In
addition, the Federal Republic views traffic between the various occu-
pied sectors as traffic within one German city. 166 Consequently, the
Federal Republic and the occupying powers have not established
passport controls for entry into West Berlin from East Berlin. 67
Exploiting this "Berlin Gap," the government of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic freely dispensed transit visas authorizing travel
through, but not permission to stay in, East Germany and allowed
planeloads of asylum-seekers from Third World countries to land in
East Berlin.'6  After collecting air fare charges, payable only in hard
of asylum-seekers decreased in 1987 to 57,379. During 1988 the numbers rose again, with
39,885 asylum-seekers registered during the first six months of 1988. Wolken, Country Report
for the Federal Republic of Germany, European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles 2 (Oct.
1-2, 1988) [hereinafter Wolken Report II].
164. Before the end of World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union agreed that their armies would occupy Berlin after their eventual victory over
Germany. Protocol on Zones of Occupation and Administration of "Greater Berlin," Sept.
12, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2078, T.I.A.S. No. 3071, 227 U.N.T.S. 279. From 1945 until 1955 these
three armies, along with the French army, occupied all of Germany, including Berlin. In
1955, the United States, England, and France transferred governance of Germany to the newly
created Federal Republic of Germany. Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in
the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, T.I.A.S. No. 3425, 331
U.N.T.S. 253. The occupation of West Berlin, however, continued, and Soviet troops
remained in East Berlin. In 1971, the four occupying powers signed an agreement, which the
Federal Republic of Germany was not allowed to sign, detailing obligations concerning travel
between the Federal Republic and West Berlin and entry into the various sectors of Berlin.
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, supra note 164, note.
165. For example, in 1971 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France notified the
Federal Republic that "[our] governments will continue, as heretofore, to exercise supreme
authority in the Western Sectors of Berlin." Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, supra note
164, note.
166. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 154, 11. The forces occupying West Berlin,
refuse to erect regular border controls between East and West Berlin because they maintain
that Berlin is still one unified city as it was in 1945. See, e.g., Int'l Herald Tribune, July 26,
1986, at 6, col. 2.
167. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 154, 111; Markham, Influx of Refugees to Berlin
Stirs Debate, Int'l Herald Tribune, July 26-27, 1986, at 6.
168. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 167. For a general description of the surge of asylum-
seekers through the "Berlin Gap", see Kjaerum, The Danish Procedure of Denial of Entry into
Denmark, in Current Asylum Policy and Humanitarian Principles 3, 3-6 (1988). Prior to 1986
many asylum-seekers traveled through East Germany to Sweden and Denmark. At the end of
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-currency, East German authorities immediately conducted the new
arrivals to the crossing points to West Berlin, where no passports or
visas were demanded for entry. 169 Once in West Berlin, the asylum-
seekers were cared for by the West German government.
As the numbers of asylum-seekers entering the Federal Republic
via East Berlin mounted daily, the political temper in the Federal
Republic soared.7 0 Not wishing to acknowledge divided sovereignty
in Berlin, the western occupying powers and the West German gov-
ernment refused to institute passport controls at the city border cross-
ings. 17 Instead they pressured the East German government, a
beneficiary of large loans from West Germany, to halt the importation
and transit of Third World asylum-seekers.17 2 Finally, an agreement
was reached. The German Democratic Republic closed the Berlin
Gap on October 1, 1986 by limiting its issuance of transit visas to
individuals possessing valid entry visas issued by the Federal Repub-
lic. 173 This change in East German policy had an immediate and
drastic effect. The number of asylum-seekers filing applications in the
Federal Republic decreased from 14,812 in August 1986 to 4,764 in
November 1986 and continued to decrease thereafter. 74
2. Recent Legislation
Although the immediate crisis of the "Berlin Gap" subsided, polit-
ical discontent with the refugee process in the Federal Republic con-
tinued. The campaigns for the general elections on January 25, 1987
included numerous exhortations to admit fewer asylum-seekers.' 5 In
addition, in late 1986 the Parliament enacted legislation designed to
speed the asylum process and discourage abuse of the asylum sys-
1985 the Swedish and Danish governments concluded agreements with the East German
government to prevent asylum-seekers lacking valid passports and visas from continuing on to
Sweden and Denmark. As a consequence, the number of asylum-seekers entering Denmark
dropped from 1140 in November 1985 to 213 in January 1986. The stream of asylum-seekers
did not stop. It was instead diverted from Denmark and Sweden to West Germany. Id. at 3.
169. Kjaerum, supra note 168, at 3; Int'l Herald Tribune, July 29, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
170. Wood, Bonn Says Refugees Have Become a Threat, Int'l Herald Tribune, July 24.
1986, at 1, col. 5; Markham, supra note 167; Int'l Herald Tribune, July 29, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
171. Markham, supra note 167.
172. Id.; see also Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 19, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
173. Wolken Report I, supra note 163, at 1; Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 29, 1986, at 5, col.
1.
174. Wolken Report I, supra note 163, at 1-2.
175. See, e.g., Markham, Kohl Unveils Plan to Limit Immigration, Int'l Herald Tribune,
Aug. 28, 1986, at 1, col. 8.
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tem. 7 6 The Law of January 6, 1987 amending the process governing
asylum, work permits, and aliens 77 erects new barriers for asylum-
seekers. '7  The new law gives border guards more power to refuse
entry to asylum-seekers, imposes fines on carriers that transport aliens
lacking travel documents to the Federal Republic, restricts the
grounds on which an asylum application can be granted, 79 and
176. See Zar Aktuell (quarterly information service of the Zeitschrift fir Ausliinderrecht
und Auslinderpolitik (Journal of Aliens Law and Policy)), Jan. 2, 1987, at 1.
177. Gesetz zur Anderung asylverfahrensrechtlicher, arbeitserlaubnisrechtlicher und
auslinderrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 6 Januar 1987 [Law of Jan. 6, 1987 to amend the
process governing asylum, work permits, and aliens], 1987 BGBI.I 89.
178. In addition to the restrictive measures discussed infra notes 179-87 and accompanying
text, the legislation includes provisions that assist asylum-seekers currently in the Federal
Republic. For example, asylum-seekers who can demonstrate the availability of alternative
housing arrangements that will not require greater expenditure of public funds are no longer
required to live in group shelters. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work
Permits, and Aliens, art. 1, § 13, 1987 BGBI.I at 91. Asylum-seekers whose cases are on
appeal by the Federal Commisioner for Asylum Affairs, see supra note 139 and accompanying
text, can leave their designated residence zones temporarily without obtaining prior
permission. Id. art. 1, § 14, 1987 BGBI.I at 91. Despite these measures, which eased
restrictions on some asylum-seekers, the thrust of the 1986 legislation was restrictive.
179. The German constitutional guarantee of asylum to political refugees has been
interpreted to include those with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. See generally
K6fner & Nicolaus, Grundlagen des Asylrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Fundamentals of the Law of Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany) § 3.2 (1986). The
definition of. these terms has engendered vigorous debate. The new law has mooted a
significant portion of this debate by expressly rejecting - and labeling as manifestly
unfounded - claims of asylum-seekers who have come to the Federal Republic to avoid
armed conflict or a general state of emergency. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of
Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, § 11, f 1, 1987 BGBI.I 91. Indeed, in a telling
conjunction, the same provision of the law rejects asylum claims based solely on economic
grounds, on armed conflict, or on a desire to avoid a general state of emergency in the
homeland. The legal significance of the "manifestly unfounded" designation is that such a
finding withdraws almost all rights to appeal from the rejected asylum-seeker who can then be
immediately expelled. See supra note 188. The political significance is that it will preclude
most claims of asylum based on the states of crises in Sri Lanka, Iran, and Lebanon, which
impelled many refugees to flee to the Federal Republic. Wolken Report I, supra note 163, at 7-
8.
Asylum-seekers may fear persecution in their homeland based on incidents that occurred
before they fled or based on events that occurred after they had departed. Post-flight grounds
(Nachfluchtg'nde) can range from events beyond the control of the asylum-seeker, such as a
change in government, to circumstances initiated by the asylum-seeker. For example, an
asylum-seeker may for the first time in the relative safety of the Federal Republic criticize his
country's government. He may begin in the Federal Republic to take part in political
demonstrations against his home government. Less obtrusively, he may simply file an
application for asylum, thereby implicitly criticizing the political system at home.
Because the credibility of the asylum-seeker is generally the crucial issue in asylum claims,
post-flight grounds for an asylum claim have often been viewed with some skepticism when the
grounds involved actions voluntarily taken by the applicant. An elaborate jurisprudence
concerning "post-flight grounds" for asylum has developed. In October 1986 the Federal
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-lengthens the time during which asylum-seekers are prohibited from
working.18 The first two measures directly impose new restrictions
Administrative Court ruled that an asylum-seeker whose fear of persecution was based solely
on post-flight activity in which he took part voluntarily, unnecessarily, and solely for the
purpose of obtaining asylum should be granted asylum. Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG)
Urteil yor 21. Oktober 1986, 9C 28.85. The court concluded that based on this post-flight
activity the applicant's homeland would likely persecute him if he returned, and held that the
objective threat of persecution outweighed the subjective intent of the asylum-seeker. In
November 1986 the Federal Constitutional Court took a less expansive view of post-flight
reasons. Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) Beschluss vom 26. November 1986,2 BvR 1058/
85. It ruled that there must be a direct connection between the political persecution and the
flight. Consequently, self-created post-flight basis for fear of persecution activity could lead to
asylum only if this activity manifested a previously held political attitude that had actually
impelled the flight and that had been expressed at home before departure. Three weeks later
the Federal Constitutional Court again examined asylum claims based on post-flight grounds.
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), Beschluss vom 17. December 1986, 2 BvR 2032/83. In
this later decision the Court reversed a lower court which had rejected as manifestly
unfounded an asylum application based on post-flight reasons. The Court emphasized that
asylum claims based solely on post-flight activity may not be automatically rejected.
The controversy surrounding post-flight grounds for asylum attracted Parliament's
attention. The 1987 legislation amends the Asylum Procedure Law by adding a new section
explicitly addressed to this issue. Section la is now entitled "Nachfluchigrnde" (post-flight
grounds). The law specifies that any actions taken by an asylum-seeker after leaving the
country of persecution cannot be considered in his application for asylum if he took these
actions in order to gain recognition as a refugee. With this provision the Parliament appears to
have rejected the approach taken by the Federal Administrative Court. This measure may
even be stricter than the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court. For example, consider an
asylum-seeker who had expressed political opposition at home, as a result began to fear
persecution and fled, then once in the Federal Republic decided to become an outspoken critic
of his home government in order that his homeland would notice him and be likely to threaten
him if he returned. In this scenario the asylum-seeker acted to assure he would be recognized
as a refugee in the Federal Republic. According to the language of the new law this individual
could be denied asylum because he undertook this post-flight activity in order to obtain
recognition as a refugee. Under the analysis of the Federal Constitutional Court, however, this
post-flight activity expressed a political attitude that had been previously held and expressed at
home and that had triggered his flight. Thus, his post-flight activity could serve as a basis for
his asylum claim. Whether the legislative provision will be interpreted as congruent with or
stricter than the Federal Constitutional Court holding remains to be seen.
180. In addition to tightening up the procedure at the border and the grounds upon which
refugee status can be based, the 1987 legislation amended the Arbeitsf-rderungsgesetzes vom
25 Juni 1969 [Law of June 25, 1969 to Promote Employment], 1969 BGBI.1 582 and the
Arbeitserlaubnisverordunung vom 12 September 1980 (Regulation on Work Permits], 1980
BGBI.I 1754. These amendments affect only those asylum-seekers who have entered the
Federal Republic. Prior to 1987 asylum-seekers were denied authorization to work for their
first two years in the Federal Republic, see Zar Aktuell, supra note 176, at 2, and were
required to reside in communal dwellings during that time while they awaited the decisions on
their applications. AsylVfG § 23, 1982 BGBI.I at 950. These measures were adopted in
response to the high unemployment rate (approximately 11%) in the Federal Republic and in
order to deter those asylum-seekers who are motivated by economic opportunities in the
Federal Republic.
The 1987 legislation amends section 19 of the Law of June 25, 1969 to Promote
Employment to increase substantially the prohibition against work. Asylum-seekers must wait
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on entry and will be examined below.
a. Authority to Border Police
Under prior law the border police of the Federal Republic had the
authority to refuse admission to asylum-seekers who managed to find
some protection from persecution en route to Germany."8 ' The new
legislation places renewed emphasis on this ground for refusal. It
explicitly authorizes the border police to deny an asylum-seeker entry
if he has previously found protection elsewhere;18 2 if he has spent
more than three months in any EEC member country or in Austria,
Switzerland, Sweden, or Norway;1 8 3 or if he posesses a Convention
Travel Document pursuant to the Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees.' 4 Most significantly, however, the 1986 legisla-
five years after filing asylum applications before they can apply for a work permit.
Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 2, § 1, 1987
BGBl.I at 92. At the end of this five-year period, they may apply to the Labor Department for
permission to work. In deciding whether to grant a work permit, the Labor Department takes
into account the general unemployment situation in the Federal Republic. Because the rate of
unemployment is high, it is difficult for an asylum-seeker to obtain official permission to work.
Klever Letter, supra note 160.
Asylum-seekers whose applications have been rejected but who have not been ordered to
depart face a one year waiting period before they can apply for work authorization.
Amendment of Jan 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits and Aliens, art. 2, § 1 1987
BGB 1.1 at 92. Spouses of rejected asylum-seekers who have not been ordered to leave have a
four-year waiting period; their children have a two-year wait. Id. § 19, T I(b). Asylum-seekers
from Eastern European countries, who are subject to different rules, need wait only one year
before applying for work permits. Arbeitserlaubnis VO. art. 1, 2. See also Wolken Report I,
supra note 163, at 8.
181. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
182. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 1, § 2,
1987 BGBI.I at 89. The 1987 law revised AsylVfG § 2(2) to provide that an alien who spent
more than three months in a country in which he was not threatened with political persecution
before coming to the Federal Republic of Germany will be presumed to have found protection
from persecution. The presumption can be rebutted by credible evidence that the asylum-
seeker lacked a sufficient guarantee against deportation from the interim country to a country
in which he might be threatened with persecution. Id.
183. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 1, § 7,
1987 BGBI.I. at 90. The 1987 law revised AsylVfG § 9 to permit denial of entry at the border
to aliens who en route to the Federal Republic had spent longer than three months in any of
the following countries: Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, or the members of the
European Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom). Again, there is an escape clause for those
who can demonstrate that they feared deportation to a country where they fear political
persecution.
184. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 1, § 7,
1987 BGBl.I at 90. Article 1, § 7 of the 1987 law also revised AsylVfG § 9 to permit rejection
at the border of those who fall within the revised § 7(3), which states: "An alien who possesses
a travel document issued by another country in recognition of his status as a refugee will be
presumed to have already found protection from persecution in another country." AsylVfG
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-tion expands the definition of "protection elsewhere. '" ' It denies a
right to asylum in the Federal Republic if the applicant has already
spent time in another country where he was safe from political perse-
cution. 18 6 It further equates a stay of more than three months in
another country without threat of political persecution with protec-
tion from persecution,187 no matter how illegal or precarious the stay.
Because the term "protection elsewhere" is more subjective and
requires greater factual development than the other two provisions,
the border police have more leeway in interpreting the phrase and,
necessarily, more discretion in applying it. It thus significantly
increases the authority of the border police. Compared to the "mani-
festly unfounded" claim and "threat to public order" criteria that
allow rejection at the border in Belgium, the "protection elsewhere"
ground for denial of entry into the Federal Republic may seem tolera-
bly precise. It is not, however, and the asylum-seekers who run afoul
of it will not be comforted by the knowledge that Belgian border
police may have even more unbridled discretion than the German
authorities.
Although the criteria for rejection of asylum-seekers at the border
are problematic, the heart of the problem in the Federal Republic as
well as in Belgium and Denmark is the summary nature of these deci-
sions. The asylum-seekers lack the ability to present their claims fully
and the legal representation to present them most effectively. The
summary nature of the decisions is further compounded by the lack of
any opportunity for meaningful appellate review' 88 and, in the case of
§ 7(3), 1982 BGBI.I at 947 (as amended by Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum,
Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 1, § 7, 1987 BGBI.1 at 90). Cf. supra note 146.
Both this provision and the provision denying refugee status to aliens who have stayed in
certain countries for at least three months stem from the "protection elsewhere" theme. In
effect, they presume that an asylum-seeker who has a Convention Travel Document or has
been in one of the listed countries has found a safe haven. Based on this presumption, the new
legislation gives the border police absolute authority to deny entry to asylum-seekers who have
traveled through certain European countries. This is so whether or not the asylum-seekers
have a legal right to remain in that country.
185. AsylVfG § 2, 1982 BGBI.I at 946.
186. AsyIVfG § 2(l), 1982 BGBI.I at 946 (as amended by Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to
Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 1, § 2, 1987 BGBI.I at 89).
187. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. I, § 2.
1987 BGBI.I at 89. See supra note 184.
188. Legislation in the Federal Republic permits an asylum-seeker turned away at the
border to seek review of that decision through the administrative court system. Letter from
Simone Wolken, Legal Counselor, Zentrale Dokumentationstelle der Freien Wohlfarhrtspflege
fur Flfichtlinge (ZDWF) (Central Documentation Center of the Voluntary Agencies for
Assitance to Refugees) (Oct. 12, 1988). For a discussion of the appellate process, see supra
notes 160-62 and accompanying text. The inadequacies of an appeals process initiated from
1988]
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Germany, by the absence of any participation by officials with special
competence in refugee matters.
b. Penalties on Airlines and Shipping Companies
The 1987 legislation prominently features provisions penalizing air,
sea, and other carriers that transport asylum-seekers who lack a valid
residence permit or temporary visa to the Federal Republic. The law
imposes a fine of 2000 Deutsch Marks for each unauthorized for-
eigner brought to the Federal Republic. 89 Furthermore, the law
makes the carriers strictly liable for any public expenditure incurred
as a result of the arrival of these unauthorized individuals in the Fed-
eral Republic.' 90
The law also requires carriers to transport unauthorized asylum-
seekers away from the Federal Republic. This duty applies to all
improperly documented asylum-seekers, those rejected at the border,
those returned to a country in which they previously stayed, and
those allowed to enter to file asylum applications later determined to
be unsuccessful,' 9' but is ameliorated somewhat by a three-year stat-
ute of limitations. 192
D. The Netherlands
L Entry for Asylum-Seekers
In the Netherlands, in contrast to Belgium, Denmark, and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the recent upsurge in the number of asy-
lum-seekers has not yet led to new restrictive legislation. 93 In the
absence of legislative action, however, administrative measures have
been taken that parallel some of the restrictions now in place in
Belgium, Denmark, and the Federal Republic. The administrative
action is more limited than the legislation previously discussed. As a
abroad are obvious, see infra text accompanying notes 280-81, and the lengthiness of the
German appeals procedure, supra note 162, only compounds these problems.
189. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 4, § 2,
1987 BGBI.I at 92.
190. Id.
191. Id. art. 4, § 1, 1987 BGBI.I at 92. See also Zar Aktuell, supra note 176, at 3.
192. The new legislation provides that a carrier's responsibility for the costs of carrying
asylum-seekers away for the Federal Republic lapses three years after arrival of the asylum-
seeker. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens, art. 4, § 1,
1987 BGBI.I at 92. See also Zar Aktuell, supra note 176, at 3. Thus, a carrier does not bear
the cost of removing an asylum-seeker whose claim is rejected and who receives an order to
depart more than three years after his entry into the Federal Republic.
193. For statistics on asylum-seekers entering the Netherlands in recent years, see infra note
224.
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-consequence, much of the pre-1987 asylum procedure described
below is still in effect. Nonetheless, certain aspects of the asylum pro-
cedure have become more summary and more restrictive.19
Prior to 1987 an alien seeking asylum in the Netherlands followed a
different procedure depending on his manner of arrival in the Nether-
lands. An alien entering legally based on a non-refugee status, as a
student, for example, was required to apply for asylum with the local
Aliens Service as soon as possible.' 95 An alien who entered without
being checked at the border' 96 was required to file an immediate asy-
lum request with the local police. 197 An asylum-seeker stopped at the
border, however, applied on the spot to the border police for asy-
lum. 198 As more and more applicants fell within this third category,
the government developed elaborate procedures to cope with asylum
requests at the border.
An alien presenting himself at the border seeking asylum in the
Netherlands was briefly interviewed by the border police,199 who then
notified the Ministry of Justice and summarized the basis of the asy-
lum claim.2'o The Ministry of Justice decided whether to permit
entry and informed the border police of the decision. °1 Entry deci-
sions were based on a preliminar evaluation of the merits of each
claim. The Ministry of Justice ordered the border police to admit
asylum-seekers who it believed had valid grounds for asylum. These
individuals were then referred to the Aliens Service.2 °2
If the Ministry of Justice concluded that the asylum claim lacked
foundation, it instructed the border police to refuse entry.20 3 If entry
was refused, the ministry of Justice sent a ministry official to the bor-
der to interview the asylum-seeker. 2  This official conducted a more
194. For a discussion of the specific aspects of the asylum procedures that were changed in
1987, see text accompanying notes 240-49, infra.
195. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 250, c 14. This generally meant within 8 days of
entry. Id.
196. In 1960 Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg abolished internal passport
controls between the three countries. Agreement of 11 April 1960. Belgium-Netherlands-
Luxembourg, 374 U.N.T.S. 3. Thus, many people are able to enter the Netherlands without
being inspected by Dutch border officials. Letter from Lex Takkenberg, Chief Legal Adisor.
Dutch Refugee Council (July 8, 1988) [hereinafter Takkenberg Letter I].
197. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 251, ' 16.
198. Id. at 250, 15.
199. Id. at 251, 18.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. The Vreemdelingendienst (Aliens Service) is an arm of the local police.
Takkenberg Letter I, supra note 196.
203. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 251, 18.
204. Id.
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thorough interview with the asylum-seeker and reported back to the
Ministry of Justice.2 °5 Again, the Ministry of Justice evaluated the
information forwarded by the interviewer. If the Ministry determined
there might be valid grounds for the asylum request, the asylum-
seeker was admitted to the country and referred to the Aliens Ser-
vice.20 6 If the Ministry concluded that the asylum-seeker was not in
immediate danger of persecution, he was refused entry and returned
to the country from which he came.20 7
This two-step entry procedure, first interview by border police, sec-
ond interview by Ministry of Justice official, was streamlined for those
asylum-seekers arriving at Schiphol Airport outside Amsterdam. The
Ministry of Justice stationed officials at the airport who interviewed
arriving asylum-seekers who lacked valid authorization to enter the
Netherlands. 208 The interview reports were quickly forwarded to the
Ministry of Justice, which could act expeditiously on the asylum
requests and immediately decide to return asylum-seekers to the
countries from which they came. °9
Asylum-seekers denied entry at the airport or elsewhere could
request reconsideration by the Minister of Justice, but in general were
not permitted to remain in the Netherlands pending the reconsidera-
tion.210 Thus, as a practical matter, asylum-seekers denied entry at
the border were forced to leave the Netherlands.2 t If they decided to
pursue their asylum claims from outside the country, they were
required to do so within thirty days.212
Although a request for reconsideration did not stay the decision to
refuse entry, Dutch law allowed an asylum-seeker to challenge this
decision by invoking a special summary judicial proceeding, the Kort
geding.2 3 Petitioning the presiding judge of the district court to con-
205. Id. at 251, 19.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 250-51, 15.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 251, 20.
211. Id. An asylum-seeker may be able to forestall immediate expulsion by obtaining a
court order prohibiting deportation. To obtain such an order he must apply to the presiding
judge of the district court who can convene a special summary procedure known as Kort
geding. Id. at 253, 34.
212. Id. at 253, 32. This reconsideration procedure is available both for those denied
entry at the border, id. 20, and for those admitted to the Netherlands, but subsequently
denied asylum. Id.
213. Id. at 251, 20 and 253 34. The Aliens Act contains no provision for judicial review
of a decision to refuse entry at the border. The courts, however, have ruled that judicial review
is available to consider whether the state's action refusing entry constitutes a tort. In so
[Vol. 29:33
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vene a Kort geding suspended the challenged government actions.2"4
The Kort geding is a speedy procedure governed by informal proce-
dural rules.2"5 Although the law provides that applicants may attend
the court hearing, asylum-seekers at Schiphol airport usually were
denied permission to attend.21 6 More than 90% of the cases submit-
ted to the Kort geding resulted in negative decisions for the asylum-
seekers.217 Asylum-seekers could appeal negative decisions, but filing
an appeal did not stay the decision.21 8 Thus, asylum-seekers who
availed themselves of the Kort geding procedure managed to delay
their departure from the Netherlands for a few days, but then gener-
ally were forced to leave.
Those individuals who requested asylum at the border and were
permitted to enter filed their formal applications for asylum with the
Aliens Service. An extensive investigation of their claims took
place,219 during which they could be represented by a lawyer and an
asylum counselor.220 Based on information submitted by the appli-
cant, official interviews, police reports, and advice from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice decided whether to grant or
deny asylum.221 Asylum was granted on either a finding of refugee
status or a finding that compelling humanitarian reasons warranted
asylum.222 The latter category was commonly known as B-status.2 3
holding, the courts have applied the general principles of Dutch administrative law, which, in
the absence of legislative provisions authorizing administrative or judicial review, allow parties
to challenge government action by filing tort actions in the civil courts. Letter from Lex
Takkenberg, Chief Legal Advisor, Dutch Refugee Council (Sept. 28, 1988) [hereinafter
Takkenberg Letter II].
214. Takkenberg Letter I, supra note 196.
215. Takkenberg Letter II, supra note 213. It has been said that the assistance of a lawyer
in this procedure is indispensable. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 253, F 34.
216. Takkenberg Letter II, supra note 213.
217. Interview with Virginia Korte Van Hemel, Secretary of State for Justice, The
Netherlands, Refugees, Oct. 1988, at 43.
218. Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 253, f 34.
219. Id. at 252, 1 22-26.
220. Id. at 252, 1 27. A non-lawyer who is a representative of a voluntary agency, such as
the Dutch Refugee Council, often works with an asylum-seeker on all aspects of his case and
helps shepherd him through the government process. Interview with Lex Takkenberg, Chief
Legal Advisor, Dutch Refugee Council, in Amsterdam, The Netherlands (June 22, 1987)
[hereinafter Takkenberg Interview III].
221. Id. at 253, 29.
222. Id. at 252-253, 11 23, 29-31.
223. An individual admitted as a refugee (toelating als viuchteling) under the terms of the
1951 Refugee Convention is granted a permanent residence permit; an individual allowed to
stay on humanitarian grounds is given a temporary residence permit (vergunning tot verblif)
marked with the letter "A" for Asielgerechtigde. This "A" permit is referred to as B-status.
Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 252-253, T 23, 30-31. For a discussion of recent legal
developments affecting B-status, see infra note 258.
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2. Recent Legal Changes
As in other countries in Northern Europe, the number of asylum-
seekers in the Netherlands increased significantly in the 1980's.
Although the total number of individual applicants was small com-
pared to thenumber in the Federal Republic of Germany, the propor-
tional increase was nonetheless dramatic. From an average of 800 to
900 asylum applications per year in the late 1970's, the number
swelled to more than 5,600 in 1985.224 This upsurge aroused fears of
the Netherlands' being engulfed by refugees and led to more restric-
tive government measures. As a result, in 1985 the total number of
asylum-seekers granted asylum dropped below 1000, the lowest
number since 1979.225 More ominously, perhaps, the rate of approval
of asylum-seekers plummeted from 57.2% in 1982 to 19.8% in
1985.226
a. Legislative Inaction
Although the Netherlands Parliament has not yet enacted legisla-
tion in response to the increase in asylum applications, the two parties
forming the center-right government coalition, the Christian Demo-
crats and the Liberals, announced that the Aliens Act, including pro-
visions dealing with refugees, would be reviewed in 1988.227 In the
interim there were several parliamentary debates concerning asylum-
seekers. On June 23, 1986, the government presented a proposal to
Parliament to require that all asylum-seekers live in communal hous-
ing.228 This proposal generated great controversy, 229 but ultimately
224. Ministry of Justice figures show the following number of arrivals of asylum-seekers in
the Netherlands: 386 in 1975; 470 in 1976; 575 in 1977; 775 in 1978; 993 in 1979; 1,330 in
1980; 754 in 1981; 1,214 in 1982; 2,015 in 1983; 2,603 in 1984; 5,644 in 1985; 5,865 in 1986,
and 13,460 in 1987. Kumin. Reception of Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands, Refugees, Oct.
1988, at 16.
225. Takkenberg, Country Report on the Netherlands, European Consultation on Refugees
and Exiles, April 1986, at 1, § I [hereinafter Takkenberg Report I].
226. The rate of approval has declined yearly, from 57.2% in 1982 to 53.5% in 1983, 37.9%
in 1984, and 19.8% in 1985. Id. at 5.
227. Florin, Country Report on the Netherlands, European Consultation on Refugees and
Exiles 2, § 2(e) (Sept. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Florin Report I]. At the time this Article went to
press, no new legislation concerning refugees had been enacted.
228. Takkenberg, Country Report on the Netherlands, European Legal Network on
Asylum 4, § 3, 4 (Nov. 1986) [hereinafter Takkenberg Report II].
229. Id. Prior to this time only Tamils were, in effect, required to live communal housing.
In April 1986, outbursts of violence occured in the Tamil housing. In June 1986, when the
government of the Netherlands proposed that all asylum-seekers live in communal housing,
Parliament responded by stating that the government should improve and regularize the
situation at the Tamil reception centers before extending housing requirements to other groups
of asylum-seekers. See id. at 4, § 3.
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-was put into effect.230 In September 1986 the government presented a
note describing its overall policy on refugees. 23  Initial parliamentary
response to the note was limited, but the Parliament did schedule dis-
cussions on the note for March 1987.2 In November 1986 the gov-
ernment presented yet another note to Parliament proposing that
refugees be treated the same as other aliens in matters concerning resi-
dence regulations and procedural protections.33 Again, Parliament
has not yet legislated on this proposal; in this instance, however, Par-
liament registered its general opposition to a plan merging procedures
governing refugees with those governing all other aliens.3
b. Recent Administrative Action
In the first few months of 1987 the number of asylum-seekers
requesting permission to remain in the Netherlands rose to 1500 per
month, generating concern over the possibility of 18,000 to 24,000
asylum-seekers per year.235 Government officials reacted quickly. In
a letter dated March 31, 1987, the Secretary of State for Justice out-
lined new guidelines for the rejection of asylum-seekers whose claims
are deemed manifestly unfounded. 3 6 This letter provoked a heated
230. On November 1, 1987, the government opened communal reception centers at five
rural locations. The Regeling Opvang Asielzoekers (ROA) [Government Regulation on the
Reception of Asylum-Seekers], which took effect on November 1. 1987. provides that asylum-
seekers will be dispersed in many different municipalities, rather than clustering in
Amsterdam. The five new government reception centers are designed to accommodate the
overflow when accommodations provided by the municipalities are filled. Asylum-seekers are
supposed to stay in these reception centers for up to nine weeks, after which they are to be
placed in private housing in the various municipalities. See Biegel, Gabreysus, and van
Heelsum, Elderly Refugees in the Netherlands, VluchtelingenWerk, 1988, at 3; Kumin, supra
note 224, at 14-16. Asylum-seekers stopped at Schiphol Airport outside Amsterdam are kept
in a reception center at the airport. See also infra notes 241, 258.
231. Florin, Country Report on the Netherlands, European Consultation on Refugees and
Exiles, Feb. 1987, at 2, § 2(a) [hereinafter Florin Report In].
232. Id. At the time this Article went to press, no new legislation concerning refugees had
been enacted.
233. Id. § 2(b).
234. Id. In July 1987 the government proposed legislation that would apply the same
procedures to refugees as are applied to other aliens. It would maintain the distinction
between "A-status7" and "B-status" refugees. Due to the controversial nature of the proposal,
it is not expected to be enacted quickly, if at all. Florin, Country Report on the Netherlands,
European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, Sept. 1987. at 4 (hereinafter Florin Report
III]. At the time this Article went to press, no new legislation concerning refugees had been
enacted.
235. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220. Although the "threat" of 24.000 asylum-
seekers per year did not materialize, the number of asylum-seekers rose dramatically, from
approximately 6,000 in 1986 to approximately 13,000 in 1987. See Kumin, supra note 224. at
16.
236. Id.
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debate in Parliament.237 In the end, however, opposition forces in
Parliament lacked the power to block the guidelines.238 On April 15,
1987, the Minister of Justice issued its new procedures. 239
i. Summary Procedures
Compared with the prior system of interviews and re-interviews,
the new procedure is more truncated and contains more stringent
standards. The method of applying for asylum still varies according
to whether the asylum-seeker enters legally in a non-refugee status,
enters without being checked at the border, or is stopped at the bor-
der. But all asylum-seekers now are interviewed briefly by police
officers wherever they happen to apply for asylum. The initial inter-
views are generally handled by officials of the Ministry of Justice; on
occasion officials of the aliens police conduct the interviews. 240 If this
cursory interview reveals that the applicant has come to the Nether-
lands from Belgium, Luxemburg, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France or Austria, or has presented a claim deemed manifestly
unfounded or fraudulent, he usually receives a negative decision
within two to three hours.241 In many instances the asylum-seeker is
detained by the police while awaiting the initial decision.242 Conse-
quently, upon receiving a negative decision, he may be immediately
expelled. 243 Those who are not immediately rejected follow the regu-
237. Id.
238. Id. These guidelines, discussed infra notes 240-49 and accompanying text, may
become the basis for government-proposed legislative revisions to the Aliens Act in 1989.
239. Id. On April 15, 1987 the Minister of Justice placed its new directive in force by
issuing a new chapter B(7) of the Vreemdelingencirculaire [Aliens Circular of Oct. 26, 1982].
The Aliens Circular is a set of three notebooks containing administrative policy concerning
aliens. The Circular fleshes out the legislative provisions of the alien's law. Chapter B(7) of
the Aliens Circular deals with refugee matters. Aliens Circular of Oct. 26, 1982. For a
description of the Aliens Circular and the ease with which it can be amended, see Takkenberg,
Country Report on the Netherlands, European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, Mar.
1988, at 2-4 [hereinafter Takkenberg Report V].
On November 1, 1987, the government issued a new regulation establishing communal
housing for asylum-seekers. Government Regulation on the Reception of Asylum-seekers,
supra note 230.
240. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220. The policy for asylum-seekers at Schiphol
Airport, described supra in text accompanying notes 188-89, has not been changed. Members
of the staff of the Minister of Justice still carry out the first interview. Negative decisions are
generally rendered at Schiphol within 24 hours. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. Asylum-seekers are also detained at the airport pending the decision on their
claims, Government officials assert that holding people at this reception facility does not
legally constitute detention because it is an aspect of the "implied authority to regulate
admission to the country." See also infra note 241.
243. Id.
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-lar pre-1987 procedures in submitting their claims for asylum.2"
Since April 15, 1987, a considerable number of asylum-seekers have
been detained, rejected, and expelled all on the same day. 4
Although the new procedure still guarantees asylum-seekers the right
to a lawyer and the right to seek reconsideration of a negative deci-
sion, these rights are of little avail. 246 Stays of negative decisions are
generally denied by the Ministry of Justice; thus, the asylum-seeker is
sent out of the country before any reconsideration can occur. This, in
effect, moots his claim, although in theory he can seek reconsideration
from abroad. 47 Compounding this difficulty is the summary nature
of the process which often moves too quickly to give lawyers sufficient
time to familiarize themselves with the cases, 248 hampering the effec-
tiveness of legal representation.24 9
The possibility of seeking to overturn the decision by invoking the
summary Kort geding judicial procedure is still available.zs There-
fore, some asylum-seekers manage to prolong their stay for a short
time while seeking judicial review. They are not, however, entitled to
a full-fledged hearing by either administrative or judicial authorities.
If detained at Schiphol airport, they generally are not even allowed to
attend the judicial hearing.21
In effect, the government of the Netherlands has administratively
established three categories of asylum-seekers whose claims lead to
instant rejection: (1) those with claims deemed manifestly unfounded;
(2) those with claims deemed fraudulent; and (3) those who passed
through Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Austria, or the Federal
Republic of Germany. This third category is the equivalent in the
Netherlands of the practice in the Federal Republic of automatically
244. For a description of these procedures, see generally text accompanying notes 195-98.
245. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220.
246. Id.
247. Id.; Interview with Frederique de Vlaming, Staff Member, UNHCR Representative to
the Netherlands, in The Hague (June 23, 1987).
248. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220.
249. In contrast to the asylum process in effect prior to April 1987, the new procedures
emphasize speedy decision-making at the expense of the thorough factual development and
skillful probing that lead to correct decisions. The speed of the decision-making is not in itself
bad. The problem is that the decision is based on an extremely cursory interview. Moreover,
the brevity of the interview is compounded by the practice of having unqualified interviewers.
Sometimes the interviewers are members of the Ministry of Justice; other times the
interviewers are police officers who do not specialize in asylum matters. For a discussion of
the incidence of inaccurate interview reports, see infra note 278.
250. For a description of the Kort geding procedure, see supra notes 213-18 and
accompanying text.
251. Takkenberg Letter II, supra note 213.
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refusing at the border asylum-seekers from certain European coun-
tries.252 The current Dutch practice is to reject immediately all asy-
lum-seekers who have even passed through any of five specified
countries; German border guards deny entry to asylum-seekers who
have traveled in any of nine neighboring countries.
This immediate refusal of asylum-seekers who have merely been in
transit through certain countries is also similar to the Danish practice
of denying entry to asylum-seekers who are from or have been in
transit in countries deemed "safe" for asylum-seekers.253 In some
respects, the practice in the Netherlands is superior to that in the Fed-
eral Republic and Denmark. The Dutch "safe" country list is signifi-
cantly shorter than the German or the Danish list.2 4 Moreover, the
availability to all litigants - including asylum-seekers in the disfa-
vored categories - of the summary Kort geding judicial procedures
before deportation is a safeguard that German and Danish law do not
provide.255
The new Dutch practice of immediate rejection of asylum-seekers
with claims deemed manifestly unfounded or fraudulent echoes
important provisions of the new Belgian legislation restricting entry of
asylum-seekers.256 The Belgian law's judicial review provisions to
prevent the return of asylum-seekers to countries where they risk
threats to their lives or liberty appear, however, to be less summary
than the Dutch judicial procedure.257 Therefore, in this respect Bel-
gian legislation provides more of a safeguard for asylum-seekers.
ii. Tightening of Standards
In addition to the promulgation of new criteria for immediate rejec-
tion and a more truncated procedure, the government response to the
increase in asylum-seekers in the mid-1980's appeared to become
252. The policy in the Federal Republic is discussed, supra, note 148. The new Federal
Republic legislation expressly allows border guards to turn back asylum-seekers from 15
European countries, but only if they have spent more than three months in those countries.
See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text. In addition, the Federal Republic has entered
into agreements with nine neighboring countries providing that it may immediately return
asylum-seekers who have passed through any of the countries to those countries. See supra
note 148 and accompanying text.
253. See generally discussion of Danish practice in text accompanying notes 112-24, supra.
254. Currently, the Danish list comprises Canada, the United States, and the Western
European countries. Kjaergaard Letter, supra note 109.
255. For a description of the reconsideration procedures available under Danish law, see
supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
256. See supra text accompanying note 44.
257. For a description of the Belgian judicial review provisions, see supra text
accompanying notes 64-68.
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-more restrictive in other ways.2 For example, officials reviewing
258. Government officials claimed that they had not changed their policy, which they
described as a "liberal refugee policy, but restrictive immigration policy." Takkenberg Report
I, supra note 225, at 1, § 2. Nonetheless, government action toward asylum-seekers became
harsher. The Secretary of State for Justice appeared to adopt stricter standards for evaluating
a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. at 2, § 2(c). In addition, conditions experienced by
asylum-seekers once they have entered the Netherlands have also become more onerous.
Asylum-seekers who are not detained must report weekly to the police. Forms of detention
have become more common. Starting in 1985 the government introduced a system of
reception centers or mandatory communal living accommodations for certain groups of
asylum-seekers. In addition, government authorities regularly detained many asylum-seekers
at Schiphol Airport near Amsterdam. Because refugee advocates were not allowed in the
transit area of the airport (the area one passes through after disembarking from the plane and
before emerging from the passport control zone) it was impossible to ascertain how many
asylum-seekers were kept waiting in that area. Nonetheless, it became known that some
asylum-seekers spent weeks there attempting to enter the Netherlands. Protests of this
practice led to the opening of a reception center at the airport where asylum-seekers can be
detained under more humane conditions. Takkenberg Report II, supra note 228, at 3-4.
There is more than one basis for asylum under Netherlands law. See supra note 227. By
definition, all granted asylum are entitled to reside in the Netherlands. The most protected
status, however, is awarded to those individuals who meet the refugee definition contained in
the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: an individual with a "well-
founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. L.A.(2).
Individuals deemed to qualify under the 1951 Refugee Convention criteria are entitled to be
admitted and granted residence in the Netherlands. They are said to receive "refugee status,"
Asylum in Europe, supra note 15, at 249-250, 1 9-11, the equivalent of "A-status."
Individuals who do not qualify under the 1951 Refugee Convention definition may still be
granted asylum in the Netherlands, however. Until 1988, an asylum-seeker who could
demonstrate compelling humanitarian reasons that indicated he should not be returned to his
homeland, might be granted a residence permit as an asylee. He was said to receive "B-
status." "B-status" originated in 1974 as a method of protecting war resisters. Asylum in
Europe, supra note 15, at 256, 47. From 1974 to 1988 it remained a part of the
administrative practice, and was expanded to offer protection to additional groups seeking
refuge. During the 1980's, "B-status" was far easier to attain than "A-status." For example
in 1986, 565 asylum-seekers were granted "B-status," while 176 were granted 'A-status."
Florin Report II, supra note 231, at 2.
Although entitled to many protections under the law of the Netherlands, an asylum-seeker
granted "B-status" was not as secure as one granted "refugee status." For example, a
"refugee" was granted the right to reside permanently, whereas a "B-status" residence permit
initially was valid for six months, and then was renewable every twelve months. Asylum in
Europe, supra note 15, at 257, 56. A "refugee ' needed no work permit; a "B-status"
individual obtained a work permit valid only for a specific job with a specific employer. Id. at
258, 62-64. With regard to social assistance, a "refugee" was treated like a Dutch citizen,
whereas a "B-status" claimant was treated like an alien. Id. at 259, r 65-66. There was a
similar discrepancy in terms of educational benefits. Id. at CC 67-69. Travel documents
provided to those granted asylum in the Netherlands, too, were different, depending on
"refugee" status or "B-status." Id. at 257, i 56-58.
The distinction between "A-status" and "B-status" has recently been called into question.
The Council of State, in a decision on February 29, 1988, ruled that in the future asylum-
seekers who satisfy the criteria leading to the grant of "B-status" will be awarded "A-status".
Whether those who received "B-status" prior to 1988 will now be treated as "C-status"
(discussed below) is open to question. Takkenberg Letter I, supra note 196. For a discussion
84 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:33
requests for asylum now scrutinize more carefully the route that an
asylum-seeker has taken to reach the Netherlands to determine if his
claim for asylum in the Netherlands can be rejected on the basis that
he voluntarily departed his country of first asylum.25 9 The Secretary
of State for Justice has indicated that any country through which the
asylum-seeker passed on his way to the Netherlands will be deemed a
country of first asylum if the asylum-seeker theoretically could have
applied for asylum there.260 This presumption will be accepted no
matter how brief the transit through the country, and can be rebutted
only if the asylum-seeker produces documents or other proof to
demonstrate that before passing through another country he had pre-
of this decision, see Takkenberg, Country Report for the Netherlands, October 1988, at 2
[hereinafter Takkenberg Report VI].
In the mid-1980's a new, even less protected "C-status" appeared to be emerging. In
numerous cases asylum-seekers were denied "A-status" and "B-status," but were allowed to
remain in the Netherlands. They were granted an ordinary residence permit. This permit
allows them to live in the Netherlands, but does not recognize the validity of their claim for
asylum. In effect, they are treated as other non-refugee aliens; they are entitled to remain so
long as the authorities periodically renew their residence permits. Perhaps the most
conspicuous example of the growth of a "C-status" occurred in the Ministry of Justice's 1986
decisions concerning 1100 Tamil asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka: I received "A-status," 25
received "B-status," and 100 received "ordinary" residence permits. Takkenberg Report I,
supra note 225, at 4. This "C-status" phenomenon, however, is not confined to Tamils. The
overall statistics for 1986 indicate that 326 asylum-seekers denied "A-status" and "B-status"
were nonetheless granted permission to reside in the Netherlands, thus receiving "C-status."
Florin Report II, supra note 231, at 2. In 1987, 237 asylum-seekers received "A-status," 444
received "B-status," and 450 received "C-status," while 7,425 were denied asylum.
Takkenberg Report V, supra note 239, at 1.
Because the "C-status" phenomenon is so new, it cannot yet be described definitively. The
indications are that asylum-seekers granted "C-status" have none of the special protections
accorded in the past to "refugee" status and "B-status" individuals. They are protected to the
extent the Dutch government protects aliens. This protection may well be inadequate,
however. Non-asylum-seeking aliens generally can rely on the protection of their home
governments, whereas "C-status" asylum-seekers are generally fleeing from their homelands
and cannot depend on their home governments' protection. See Takkenberg, European Legal
Network on Asylum, Country Report for the Netherlands, Feb. 1988, at 2-3 [hereinafter
Takkenberg Report IV].
The emergence of lesser forms of protection for asylum-seekers in the Netherlands is
troubling. To the extent that the growth of "B-status" and "C-status" signifies that the
Netherlands recognizes that many asylum-seekers have fled from dangerous situations and
should not be returned to their homelands, one might describe this as a somewhat positive
trend. Nonetheless, it is a negative development that lower levels of protection for asylum-
seekers have not only become acceptable, but have supplanted "refugee-status" as the typical
mode of asylum in the Netherlands.
259. Takkenberg Report I, supra note 225, at 1, § 2(a). See discussion of "protection
elsewhere," supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text, a concept similar to the concept of
"country of first asylum."
260. Florin Report I, supra note 227, at 3, § 2(g).
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viously formed an intent to apply for asylum in the Netherlands .6'
This presumption may have an even broader effect in turning away
asylum-seekers than the Danish practice of returning asylum-seekers
to "safe" countries through which they traveled.262
c. Penalties on Airlines and Other Deterrent Measures
Among the countries surveyed, the Netherlands alone does not
impose fines on air carriers that land in the Netherlands carrying asy-
lum-seekers who lack valid entry visas or other travel documents.
Current legislation does not authorize such financial penalties against
shipping companies and carriers,2 63 but the government has
announced that such penalties will be proposed in new aliens legisla-
tion.2" The administrative practice, to date, has not moved in this
direction, although present legislation does require carriers to bear the
costs of returning "inadmissible passengers. 265
Current administrative policy has, however, had a significant
impact on airlines as a result of the imposition of increasingly strin-
gent transit visa requirements.266 The government requires inhabit-
ants of certain countries to obtain transit visas if their travel plans
require them to pass through the Netherlands en route to their final
destination. This requirement applies no matter how short the sched-
uled transit time in the Netherlands. As a consequence, citizens of
countries to which the transit visa requirement applies find travel
more difficult and sometimes impossible. Not only must they obtain
an entry visa for their destination country, but they must also go to a
Dutch consulate abroad and obtain a transit visa for the Netherlands.
Only those possessing this transit visa may board an airplane sched-
uled to make a stopover in the Netherlands.
The transit visa requirement does not apply with equal force to all
non-Dutch nationals, but is instead aimed at specific countries. Not
surprisingly, in light of the government's fear of being engulfed by
asylum-seekers, it targets refugee-producing countries.267 The list of
261. Id.
262. The Danish authorities consider Canada, the United States, and all Western European
nations to be safe countries, see supra note 118 and accompanying text. The Dutch may deem
additional countries to be countries of first asylum.
263. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220.
264. Takkenberg Letter I, supra note 196.
265. Id.
266. Takkenberg Report I, supra note 225, at 2, § 2(d).
267. Id. A cursory examination demonstrates this targeting. The transit visa requirement
applies to citizens of Sri Lanka, to Turkish citizens who are not residents of a European or
American country, to Afghanis who purchased their plane tickets in Pakistan, India, or Nepal,
19881
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targeted countries is not static. For example, as more asylum-seekers
from Ghana and Zaire sought to enter the Netherlands in the mid-
1980's, those countries were added to the list.26 By 1987 the govern-
ment of the Netherlands had increased the number of countries on the
transit visa list to twenty. 269 The obvious intent was to deter asylum-
seekers from seeking refuge in the Netherlands during a stopover at
Schiphol Airport. Indeed, this practice, together with the new sum-
mary procedures, appears to have had the desired result. The number
of asylum-seekers attempting to enter the Netherlands decreased from
1500 per month at the beginning of 1987 to 800 per month during the
summer of 1987.270
II. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF RECENTLY ENACTED
ASYLUM LEGISLATION
A. Summary Border Proceedings
The new legislation in Belgium, Denmark, and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany gives border guards great authority over asylum-seek-
ers.271 The administrative practice in the Netherlands grants similar
power to officials of the aliens police.272 In all four countries, the lack
of opportunity for a searching appeal of the initial decision to refuse
entry magnifies the power granted these authorities.27 a Although the
grounds for summary denial of entry differ from country to coun-
try,17 in each country the new law permits authorities to base the
initial rejection on a proceeding so summary that it vitiates all confi-
dence in the fairness of the decision. One would not expect elaborate,
full-blown judicial proceedings available at every border crossing.
to Iraquis who bought their tickets in Syria or Iran, and to Iranians who booked passage in
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Nepal, or Thailand. Id.
268. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220.
269. Florin Report II, supra note 231, at 3, § 2(d).
270. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220. The number of applicants for each month
of 1987 follows: 1,111 in January; 1,307 in February; 1,922 in March; 1,683 in April; 1,020 in
May; 820 in June; 749 in July; 753 in August; 1,096 in September; 1,143 in October; 996 in
November; and 935 in December. Takkenberg Report V, supra note 239, at 1-2.
271. The authority given border guards under the new legislation is discussed, supra, in
Parts I.A.2.a. (Belgium), B.2.a. (Denmark), and C.2.a. (Federal Republic of Germany).
272. The administrative practice in the Netherlands is discussed, supra, in Part I.D.2.b.
273. See country-by-country discussion, supra, Part I.
274. Belgium has five categories that lead to instant rejection, supra notes 42-47 and
accompanying text; Denmark has five categories, different from and more narrowly defined
than those in Belgium, supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text; the Federal Republic has
three categories, two of which are quite precise, supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text;
and the Netherlands has three threshold issues that lead to immediate rejection of an asylum
claims, text accompanying notes 251-25, supra.
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Nonetheless, the lack of even minimal procedural safeguards for refu-
gee decisions that can have life or death consequences is appalling.
The recently adopted legal provisions described in this Article
share certain glaring procedural defects: the decision-makers are
unsuitable; the hearings are inadequate; the decisions are made under
undue pressure; the officials have unbridled discretion; the appeal, if
any, is insufficient.275 These deficiencies will be examined below.
L Unsuitable Decision-Makers
The legislation authorizing summary denial of entry to asylum-
seekers at the border places the power of life and death in the hands of
border guards.276 These individuals, although they may be trained in
the skills needed to deal with routine travelers and criminals, are gen-
erally untrained in skills pertinent to detecting a bona fide claim for
asylum. Without training or expertise in refugee law at either the
international or municipal level, they are likely to overlook the impor-
tant, but perhaps subtle, elements of a refugee's case. Furthermore,
without training at interviewing skills, and particularly interviewing
individuals from cultures different from their own, the border guards
may often be unable to elicit relevant information that supports asy-
lum claims. This difficulty may often be exacerbated by the problem
of communicating with someone who speaks a different language.
In addition, border guards most likely develop a law enforcement
mentality. Much of their routine work focuses on detecting criminal
activity. Attuned to skulduggery and deceit, they may become cyni-
cal about human nature. Such cynicism may unduly distort their
evaluation of the claims of asylum-seekers. There is cause for concern
when the law entrusts to border guards or to other police officers the
power to make decisions on refugee claims.
2. Inadequate Hearing
The problems associated with using border guards as decision-mak-
ers is compounded by the inadequate hearing provided under the new
laws.277 In essence, the hearing is a short interview with a border
guard. The asylum-seeker states that he is a refugee, shows whatever
275. These procedural defects are described in the country-by-country analysis, supra, Part
I.
276. In the Netherlands asylum-seekers are interviewed by the aliens police or officials of
the Ministry of Justice. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. For ease of description,
all future references to border guards will also encompass a reference to officials of the
Ministry of Justice.
277. The inadequacy of hearings is discussed country-by-country, supra. Part I.
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evidence he has been able to assemble, and seeks admission. The
guard looks at the documents, perhaps asks questions, and makes his
decision. The asylum-seeker has no ability to make a record. In addi-
tion, the asylum-seeker generally has no access to an attorney or to
any other type of advocate to help present his case, and is not entitled
to an interpreter.
In short, the summary proceedings at the border contemplate the
most cursory type of interrogation by a law enforcement officer. This
inquiry will be directed at an individual who likely speaks another
language, is unfamiliar with the culture and proceedings of the coun-
try he is trying to enter, is unable, because of his flight, to gather and
present the evidence necessary to bolster his asylum claim, and lacks
legal representation. Initial errors are bound to occur. Indeed, there
is evidence that, at least in the Netherlands, cursory interviews of asy-
lum-seekers in similar settings have resulted in mistaken impressions
of asylum-seekers' statements in well over a majority of the cases.278
Furthermore, due to the summary nature of the encounter at the bor-
der, the opportunity to seek more time to develop and present further
evidence is unavailable. Consequently, these impediments to present-
ing and articulating refugee claims make it likely that a significant
number of incorrect decisions will occur.
3. Circumstances of Undue Pressure
The possibility of error and abuse is magnified by the practical
impediments at most borders and in many airports. The personnel
who actually interview and evaluate asylum-seekers at these locations
are likely to be law enforcement officers or civil servants untrained in
international law. Furthermore, they are required to deal quickly
with large numbers of people, asylum-seekers and non-asylum-seekers
alike. They must make instantaneous decisions based on minimal
information. Prejudices and presumptions, intensified by frustration,
are bound to play a large role in the decision-making process. Such
circumstances clearly detract from the border personnel's ability to
elicit pertinent information and reach accurate decisions about issues
as important as the need for protection from persecution. Errors are
bound to occur. Thus, legislation which consigns many asylum deci-
278. Takkenberg Interview III, supra note 220. The first short initial interview by the aliens
police, see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text, generally led to a report filed by the
interviewer within 24 hours of the interview. The reports, which were largely recountings of
factual information provided by the asylum-seekers, contained inaccuracies from 70 to 80
percent of the time.
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* sions to this type of pressured atmosphere is severely deficient because
it undermines both accuracy and fairness.
4. Uncircumscribed Discretion
In addition to their procedural inadequacies, the new legislative
provisions permitting summary rejection are open to criticism because
of the broad discretion they give border guards. The vagueness of the
Belgian criteria for summary rejection are particularly worrisome.2"
Yet each of the laws previously described allows summary denial of
entry based on vague criteria such as "threat to public order" or
"manifestly unfounded" or "protection furnished elsewhere." Such
ambiguous terms, in effect, constitute grants of broad discretion to the
initial decision-makers, the often harried and cynical border guards.
They can interpret the legislative criteria narrowly or loosely, as they
choose. They have significant leeway to incorporate their personal
predilections into their decisions. Indeed, their discretion in these sit-
uations is virtually uncircumscribed. In light of the guards' lack of
expertise in refugee matters, the pressured situations in which they
sometimes work, and the cursory review contemplated by the new
laws, this grant of broad discretion is especially troubling.
5. Insufficient Appellate Review
By far the most glaring defect in the legislation allowing border
guards to reject summarily certain categories of asylum-seekers is the
lack of a meaningful opportunity for review of the initial negative
decisions. In some countries, Denmark and the Federal Republic of
Germany, for example, the legislation simply lacks provisions for any
appellate review of these decisions at the border before the asylum-
seeker is forced to leave. In other countries such as Belgium and the
Netherlands, the law does allow an asylum-seeker a second chance of
sorts. Unfortunately, none of the four countries provides a full-
fledged appeal at a meaningful time.
Under Danish and West German law the opportunity to appeal
occurs only after the asylum-seeker has been denied entry and sent
back to the country from which he came. 28 0 Thus, the only possible
reconsideration does not occur at a time when it can be useful. In
most instances, this right to appeal becomes only a theoretical safe-
279. Vague terms such as "manifestly unfounded" are not unique to the legislation of
Belgium and its neighbors. The Executive Committee of the UNHCR itself has used this term.
See supra note 55.
280. See text accompanying notes 115-16 and 188, supra.
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guard. An asylum-seeker appealing from abroad faces grave difficul-
ties in consulting with a lawyer experienced in refugee law and
familiar with the procedures of Denmark or the Federal Republic.
Merely communicating the basis for his asylum claim and assisting
his lawyer by collecting evidence to support this claim, often difficult
tasks even when attorney and client are in the same city, become
nearly impossible from a distance. Moreover, the effort is almost
always complicated further by differences in language and culture.
Perhaps the most formidable barrier, however, is the catch-22 situ-
ation of the asylum-seeker appealing from abroad to protest his rejec-
tion at the border. If he has the time, energy, and perseverance to
help assemble an adequate appeal, it is unlikely that he is being or is
about to be persecuted. If persecuted, he probably will not be able to
prepare an appeal and communicate with his lawyer. If he has a well-
founded fear of persecution in his homeland but presently is in a third
country in which he is safe from persecution, Danish and West Ger-
man authorities will have no incentive to encourage him to leave his
current haven and will feel no obligation to assist him to enter Den-
mark or the Federal Republic.
Even when the legislation permits some type of review of a negative
border decision before the asylum-seeker is turned away,2"' the review
is so rudimentary as to lack any significant chance of correcting erro-
neous decisions. First, because the initial decision is based on a sparse
record, there is, in effect, no record to review on appeal.28 2 Second,
the law allows no time to prepare an adequate request for review. 283
Any legal arguments will necessarily be hastily prepared. There is
little, if any, time to gather more persuasive evidence or opportunity
to supplement the record in support of the asylum-seeker's request for
admission. Indeed, the asylum-seeker may not even know what fur-
ther evidence would be helpful, as the laws do not require that the
basis for the initial decision be provided.284 Moreover, for all practi-
281. Both Belgium and the Netherlands provide for review. See supra text accompanying
notes 56-68 and 210-19.
282. This deficiency also undermines the efficacy of the advisory opinion requirement in
Belgium, supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. Although the law mandates that on
reconsideration the Minister of Justice must seek advice from the Director of the Office for
Refugees and Stateless Persons, the advisory opinion must be made in haste, based on the same
non-existent or inadequate record, and is not binding.
283 In Belgium the appeal to the court must be filed within two working days after
receiving the negative decision. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. In the Netherlands
the time in which the judicial proceeding must be started has been shortened from 30 days to 7
days. Takkenberg Report V, supra note 239, at 3.
284. See supra note 61.
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.cal purposes there is no ability to procure legal assistance to help in
the review. The appeal occurs so quickly that either the asylum-
seeker cannot locate a lawyer to assist him, or the lawyer, if hired,
cannot familiarize himself with the case in time to be useful.
Furthermore, although the Belgian legislation allows rudimentary
review of denials, it does not contemplate an independent review
board or appellate tribunal. The review essentially consists of asking
the same officials - or others in their department - who made the
initial decision refusing entry to think a second time about their deci-
sion. Unfortunately, the defects of the initial decision process reap-
pear during the reconsideration process. Once again, there is usually
little to reconsider because the record is inadequate or nonexistent. In
addition, the sense of haste that characterizes the initial process fre-
quently factors into the reconsideration proceedings. Thus, most
reconsiderations are likely to be merely pro forma.
The 1987 Belgian legislation does contain a provision allowing judi-
cial review of border decisions when an asylum-seeker alleges that
turning him away will endanger his life or liberty. 8 5 Similarly, the
availability in the Netherlands of the summary Kort geding judicial
proceeding in which an asylum-seeker can challenge the decision to
refuse him entry also affords a modicum of protection.286 These pro-
visions are insufficient. They founder on the inadequacy of the record
developed below, the speed with which the judicial process must be
invoked, and the consequent difficulty of obtaining effective legal
assistance. Thus, although some judicial review is available in
Belgium and the Netherlands, the preconditions for effective judicial
oversight are not present.
The lack of full appellate proceedings, either administrative or judi-
cial, compounds the problems of the asylum-seeker at the border.
The guard rejecting claims at the border need not consider the possi-
bility that his decisions will be analyzed and reevaluated and thus has
no incentives for accurate and fair evaluation. The lack of an
independent review body also means that there is no institution likely
to detect patterns of error or abuse. As a consequence, incorrect deci-
sions will occur, will perhaps encourage future errors, and will remain
beyond correction. Individuals, as well as the system, will suffer.
In summary, the significance of these legislative changes granting
border authorities the explicit authority to refuse admission to asy-
lum-seekers cannot be overstated. Law enforcement personnel
285. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
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untrained in international and domestic refugee law are authorized to
make snap decisions that are essentially unalterable. The criteria for
their decisions enable them to exercise broad discretionary power,
from which there is no effective appeal. Indeed, the possibility of a
searching review of the initial decision is precluded by the very nature
of the border proceeding. The record to be reconsidered is likely to be
nonexistent or, at best, inadequate. Further, the reconsideration gen-
erally is undertaken in haste by officials who do not constitute an
independent appellate tribunal. Thus, although it is possible that the
perfunctory appellate procedure may lead on occasion to the correc-
tion of an erroneous decision, the laws fail to provide a reliable proce-
dure for identifying and rectifying errors.
B. Penalties and Seizures of Aircraft
The new legislative measures providing for fines on carriers and
permitting the seizure of aircraft suffer from many deficiencies. First,
they assign to employees of commercial enterprises the crucial gov-
ernment function of deciding which individuals should be allowed to
enter the country. They thus privatize a fundamental government
function, one that governments often refer to as the essence of sover-
eignty.287 Specifically, they permit airline employees, private individ-
uals of various nationalities who live and work in the many countries
from which the flights originate, to interpret and apply the laws of the
country in which the planes land.288 These individuals do not receive
training in the international and municipal laws concerning refugees.
Nor do they necessarily have any understanding of the culture and
accepted practices of the country whose fundamental functions they
are performing.
Second, the laws make no provision for appeal of decisions by air-
line personnel and offer no way to correct errors made in assessing the
travel documents of a refugee bound for Belgium, Denmark, or the
Federal Republic of Germany. More fundamentally, the individual
excluded from the flight has, by definition, been prevented from
reaching the destination and thus prevented from seeking redress
there. Even if he somehow gets to Belgium, Denmark, or the Federal
287. See, e.g., Decision of 18 November 1986, District Court of Haarlem (government can
detain asylum-seekers at airport to prevent entry into the Netherlands); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (power to exclude foreigners
is incident of sovereignty belonging to government).
288. In some cases the airline employees excluding refugees from airplanes will be citizens
of the country the refugees are fleeing. This situation obviously raises questions about the
impartiality of the decision-maker, who is entrusted with a politically sensitive decision.
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-Republic and wishes to challenge the earlier decision removing him
from the flight, he is unlikely to find a remedy.289 Because private
rather than government employees carried out the law, the traditional
legal avenues for challenging incorrect government action would be
unavailing. 290
Third, the laws permitting seizures of aircraft place such strong
financial pressures on the airlines that they distort the decision-mak-
ing process delegated to the airlines. Since fines and seizures only
come into play if people arrive at the destination lacking the required
travel documents, the laws encourage airlines to exclude people from
flights. Incorrect decisions that allow refugees to arrive are punished;
incorrect decisions that prevent properly documented refugees from
arriving go unpunished. In the absence of the realistic possibility of
financial judgments against airlines for wrongful exclusion, there is no
significant counterweight to the pressure placed on the airlines to
exclude. A process in which the decision-maker has such a strong
financial incentive to reach a particular conclusion cannot ensure
accurate decisions.
Last, and most important, by pressuring airlines to exclude passen-
gers without proper travel documents,29' the seizure and fine provi-
289. Admittedly, if he reaches his destination, the issue of his prior exclusion from an
aircraft is likely to be of little current concern to him. For this reason the occasional asylum-
seeker who succeeds in reaching Belgium, Denmark, and the Federal Republic and applying
for asylum will lack incentive to file suit against a past wrongful exclusion from an aircraft.
Consequently, there will be few, if any, challenges to this delegation of government authority
to private profit-making enterprises, and the delegated decisions will remain unappealable.
290. For example, a refugee incorrectly excluded from a flight to Belgium who later arrived
in Belgium might fie suit. If the refugee initiated a suit against the government, it is unlikely
that the courts would deem the airline employee a government official, and the claim would be
dismissed. A private action against the airline by the refugee would probably also be
dismissed. It is unlikely the Belgian courts would entertain an action by a non-Belgian with
few, if any, ties to Belgium against another non-Belgian based on a decision made and action
taken in some country other than Belgium.
Because no legal challenges to airline crew decisions made outside Belgium to exclude
asylum-seekers from a Belgian-bound flight have been reported, the Belgian courts have not
ruled on this issue. Although Belgium would presumably have personal jurisdiction over a
defendant airline company based on its business activities in Belgium, it seems likely that the
Belgian courts would be reluctant to accept jurisdiction over a potentially large number of
suits with relatively minimal connection with Belgium (e.g., suits against Lufthansa for
excluding Tamil asylum-seekers who attempted to board in New Delhi flights scheduled to
stopover at the Zaventem Airport near Brussels).
291. The 1987 Belgian and German legislation imposing fines on carriers and authorizing
seizures of vessels contain no exceptions for bona fide refugees. Rather these laws are framed as
blanket provisions penalizing all those who transport individuals lackng the prescribed travel
documents. In light of the difficulties that many refugees face in obtaining passports and exit
visas from the countries they are fleeing as well as entrance visas for other countries, these
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sions ignore the reality that often faces refugees. Many refugees, due
to the very circumstances that make them refugees, flee with no travel
documents at all. Others flee with incomplete or false papers. Ironi-
cally, the new legislation ensures that those individuals fleeing from
government persecution - as required by the refugee definition -
who are lucky enough to be able to escape and buy passage on an
airplane will attract the attention of airline employees and will likely
be excluded from flights to or through Belgium, Denmark, and the
Federal Republic. No matter how compelling their situation and
extensive their proof that they are refugees, they will be totally barred
from such flights unless they possess valid passports and hold valid
visas issued by officials of the destination and transit governments.292
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
A. The Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
1. The Duty of Non-refoulement
In the aftermath of the Nazi era, the turmoil of World War II, and
the inadequate responses by nations to refugees fleeing their home-
lands in the 1930's and 1940's, the United Nations sponsored a Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries in 1951 to address the need for legal
protection of refugees.2 93 This conference was the genesis of the 1951
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 294 The Con-
vention defines those who qualify as refugees and outlines the legal
measures are especially severe. Their seeming neutrality is belied by their devastating impact
on refugees.
292. Many countries are now requiring aliens to procure visas when their travel plans entail
any passage, no matter how brief, through their territory. See, e.g., discussion of the visa
requirement imposed by the Netherlands, supra, in text accompanying notes 263-66. Thus, a
Ghanaian traveling to Canada on a flight that has a one hour stopover at Schiphol Airport
outside Amsterdam would need to obtain two visas: a transit visa issued by the Netherlands
Consulate in Ghana, and an entrance visa issued by the Canadian Consulate in Ghana.
293. Refugees and Displaced Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
2/108, U.N. Sales No. 1951.IV.6 (1951) [hereinafter Conference of Plenipotentiaries]. This
conference was convened in Geneva from July 2 to 25, 1951 in response to G.A. Res. 429(V), 5
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
294. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries
reviewed the work submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, which was established in January 1950 in response to the concern of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that a treaty for the protection of refugees
was necessary. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, supra note 293, at 6. The work of this
Committee was essentially adopted by the Conference as the Geneva Convention of 28 July
1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees. See generally Robinson, Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees: Its History, Contents and Interpretation (1953).
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-status of refugees. 295  Article 33 of the Convention,296 a provision
binding on all signatories,297 guarantees that refugees will not be
returned to countries in which their lives or freedom would be
threatened. It imposes on signatories an absolute duty, often referred
to as the duty of non-refoulement, not to take actions that result in the
return of refugees to persecution. 298
One hundred and two nations, 299 including Belgium, Denmark, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands, have signed the
1951 Geneva Convention 3°° and its update, the 1967 Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees.301 These countries are legally obligated
to refrain from returning refugees to countries in which their lives or
freedom would be threatened. This obligation binds government offi-
cials, as well as their delegates who carry out government policy. The
summary procedures at the border and the financial penalties imposed
on airlines and shipping lines that allow improperly documented asy-
lum-seekers to book passage are measures designed to restrict the flow
of asylum-seekers. They aim to deter future asylum-seekers by actu-
ally turning away many current asylum-seekers. They do so accord-
ing to procedures containing so few procedural safeguards that there
295. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1.
296. Article 33 provides:
1. No contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 33.
297. The treaty provides that signatories may make reservations to all articles of the
Convention other than Articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1), 33, and 36-46. Id. art. 42.
298. Id.
299. UNHCR Information Paper, Apr. 1987, Annex I (May 1987 update).
300. Three nations, Monaco, Madagascar, and Mozambique, have signed the 1951
Convention only. Id.
301. The Convention expressly refers only to refugees resulting from events that occurred
prior to January 1, 1951. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1. The Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees was drafted to protect persons who became refugees as a
result of events occurring after January 1, 1951. Protocol, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791. See G.A. Res. 2198, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The Protocol changes the 1951 time deadline in Article I and incorporates Articles 2
through 34 of the Convention. Thus, signatories of the Protocol are bound by the non-
refoulement provision of Article 33. Three nations, the United States, Venezuela, and
Swaziland, have signed only the 1967 Protocol. Ninety-six other nations have signed both the
Protocol and the Convention. UNHCR Information Paper, supra note 242.
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is a high likelihood of erroneous decisions. The lack of effective
appellate review of the summary border proceedings and of the airline
companies' decisions to exclude refugees from flights bound to or
through Belgium, Denmark, and the Federal Republic ensures that
many of these decisions will not be corrected. Consequently, the
recently adopted laws will result in the denial of entry to a number of
bona fide refugees who, as a result, will be endangered by a return to a
country in which their lives or freedom would be threatened. Thus,
Article 33 will be violated. In short, these new legal provisions are so
procedurally deficient that they run afoul of the Article 33 duty to
refrain from returning refugees to persecution.
In addition to violating the non-refoulement mandate of Article 33,
these laws violate the notion that the right to a meaningful hearing
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss is a principle basic to
civilized society.3 °2 They ignore the principle mandating that govern-
ments implement additional procedural safeguards to minimize errors
when the risk that errors will occur is high and the nature of the loss
that will be suffered if an error does occur is grievous. 30 3 The general
recognition of these principles and the need for heightened procedural
protection in face of potential grievous loss has led to international
law protecting the rights of those accused of criminal offenses.3°
Similar concerns have led to the growth of international law recogniz-
ing the need for adequate procedures when other fundamental rights
are threatened. 30 5  Although violations of the non-refoulement obliga-
tion do not involve the stigma and hardship of a criminal convic-
tion,30 6 the consequences of being sent back to a country to face
threats to life and freedom obviously can be far more severe than a
criminal sentence. Accordingly, the serious results of violating Arti-
cle 33 warrant procedures that are likely to yield enough relevant
information to result in accurate decisions. Otherwise, procedural
inadequacies will reduce the substantive right of non-refoulement to
empty words.
302. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
303. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
304. See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 10, 11, G.A. Res. 217
A(III) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Human Rights Convention, supra note 8, arts. 5, 6;
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 7, 8, OAS T.S. No. 36, at 1,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
305. See, e.g., Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 304;
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8 (in determination of
obligations and civil rights, everyone is entitled to a fair trial by an independent hearing).
306. See Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168.
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. The procedural safeguards surrounding rejection of asylum-seekers
in airports and borders need not be so stringent that an incorrect deci-
sion cannot possibly occur. Rather the safeguards must be sufficient
to ensure that correct decisions are reached in most instances. The
guarantees set out by the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees for procedures determining refugee status suggest procedures
for determining non-refoulement claims:
(1) competent officials instructed in refugee law should be
the decision-makers;
(2) non-refoulement claims should be decided by a higher
-and preferably central - authority than a border guard
or a regular police officer;
(3) the asylum-seeker should receive adequate instruction
as to how to present his non-refoulement claim;
(4) the asylum-seeker should be able to use a competent
interpreter, if necessary;
(5) the asylum-seeker should be informed that he can con-
sult with a UNHCR representative;
(6) an asylum-seeker whose non-refoulement claim is
rejected should have a reasonable time to appeal for a for-
mal reconsideration of the initial decision;
(7) an asylum-seeker should not be turned away while the
appeal of his non-refoulement claim is pending.30 7
Although other procedural safeguards for non-refoulement claims
may also be desirable, such minimal guarantees would vastly improve
the summary procedures embodied in the recent Belgian, Danish,
Dutch, and West German laws. It is certain that they would yield
more correct decisions concerning the non-refoulement claims
presented by asylum-seekers and thus reduce the risk of asylum-seek-
ers being sent to countries where they face likely persecution.
Although better procedures would undoubtedly improve the deci-
sion-making, government officials do not concede that better proce-
dures are required. Instead, a number of arguments have been raised
to support the contention that neither the summary border proceed-
ings nor the fines on airlines violate Article 33. First, these measures
merely reaffirm a nation's right to deny asylum. Second, Article 33
only applies to those legally recognized as refugees. Third, a nation
has no duty under the Geneva Convention to those individuals
307. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status at
45-46, 192 (1979) [Recommendation by E.cecutiw. Cmmaittee of UNHCR. October 1977].
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beyond the nation's borders. Fourth, the duty on non-refoulement
applies only to a minuscule subgroup of asylum-seekers. Fifth, the
new legal measures at issue provide sufficient protection because most
asylum-seekers in Europe will be returned to third countries, not to
their homelands. An examination of these assertions reveals that each
is unconvincing.
The first argument is that summary border proceedings and airline
fines simply reaffirm a nation's sovereign right to control entry into its
territory. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not grant a right of asy-
lum to refugees. Therefore, the argument develops, whether an asy-
lum-seeker is a bona fide refugee or not is irrelevant. Even a bona fide
refugee has no right to asylum in this country, and the new laws
merely reaffirm a nation's right to refuse asylum.
As to the right to refuse to grant asylum, there is no dispute. The
1951 Refugee Convention imposes no duty to grant asylum to refu-
gees. °8 This does not end the discussion, however. Despite the fact
that the 1951 Refugee Convention does not guarantee a refugee a
right to asylum in a signatory country, Article 33 absolutely forbids a
refugee's return in certain circumstances." 9 Thus, under Article 33 a
signatory may refuse a refugee asylum, which connotes a permanent
or long-term right of residence, but may not turn him back to a place
where his life or freedom would be threatened.310 Accordingly, Arti-
cle 33 mandates that this refugee is entitled to stay in the signatory
country until the government can find an alternative solution. 3 ' The
government may choose to let him stay until conditions become less
threatening in the country he departed, attempt to help him resettle in
another country, or deport him to yet another country in which his
life or freedom would not be threatened. In sum, although Article 33
provides no entitlement to asylum, it significantly limits the govern-
ment's rejection options. To the extent that the new legislation results
in turning away refugees who face threats to their lives or freedom,
these laws violate Article 33.
Second, it is said that the 1951 Refugee Convention protects only
refugees, not asylum-seekers. 1 2 Arguably, therefore, a signatory's
duty under the Convention is not triggered until an asylum-seeker is
recognized as a refugee. Such an interpretation, however, would turn
reality on its head. It is not a government's acknowledgement of
308. G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law 104-05 (1983).
309. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 33.
310. Id.
311. G. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 308, at 82-83.
312. Id. at 73.
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one's predicament that makes that individual a refugee. Rather, it is
the actual facts of his life - his well-founded fear of persecution
based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group - that make him a refugee. It is true that
all asylum-seekers do not qualify as refugees; yet some asylum-seekers
are refugees. 1 Therefore, governments that turn away all or most
asylum-seekers will likely turn away some refugees and violate Article
33.
Third, signatories might assert that their duties under the Conven-
tion apply only to refugees within their territory and not to refugees
outside their territory - whether they are at the border or in a third
country attempting to board a plane bound for a signatory country.314
The physical presence argument fails on two grounds. First, many of
the asylum-seekers claiming the protection of Article 33 are already,
in fact, within the territory of a signatory. For example, all of those
who arrive at a nation's airport are physically within the territory
from the moment their plane lands. They may not yet have passed
through passport control and thus may not be deemed to have made a
legal entry, but they are actually present in a nation's territory. In
addition, depending on the placement of the border station, even
those stopped at a border as opposed to at an airport may be physi-
cally present within the territory claimed by the country they are
seeking to enter. Therefore, even if one accepts the argument that the
application of Article 33 is limited to those asylum-seekers physically
present within a nation's territory, many asylum-seekers at airports
and border crossings fall within the protected group.
Furthermore, the non-refoulement prohibition of Article 33 has
been interpreted to apply to asylum-seekers at the border as well as to
those who have crossed the border.31 5 It would thwart the Conven-
tion's purpose of providing protection to refugees if signatories could
313. Furthermore, the view that refugees are created solely by government recognition of
refugee status leads to absurd results. Under such an interpretation a signatory of the 1951
Refugee Convention could comply fully with all the treaty terms by automatically denying
recognition to all who claim they are refugees. Indeed, such an interpretation would
encourage this result, which is clearly contradictory to the whole purpose behind the 1951
Refugee Convention. Moreover, nothing in the Convention supports the view that official
government recognition is dispositive in determining refugee status. Indeed, the Convention
does not even address the issue of how and when a government should officially recognize an
asylum-seeker as a refugee. See generally 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7. Rather, the
Convention places great emphasis on the underlying circumstances that create refugees. Id.
arL I.
314. G. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 308, at 74-75.
315. Id. at 76-77.
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declare themselves in full compliance with the Convention while
simultaneously turning away bona fide refugees at the border and
sending them back to life-threatening situations. Such a legalistic and
cynical approach would have justified denying landing rights to
boatloads of Jewish refugees in flight from Hitler and forcing them to
return to Germany, a result the drafters of the Convention could
hardly have intended. Indeed, perhaps in partial response to the hor-
rible consequences of just such legalistic approaches to refugees, over
the past fifty years customary international law has developed to
require greater protection to refugees at the border.a16
Fourth, the language of the 1951 Refugee Convention may be inter-
preted to apply the duty of non-refoulement only to a minuscule
group of asylum-seekers.31 7 Article 33 expressly prohibits the expul-
sion "or return [of] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the fron-
tiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. ' '31 8 The Convention then defines a
refugee as an individual who has a "well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion. '319
Although the Convention definition of a refugee is quite similar to
its terms in Article 33, there are two differences. First, Article 33
refers to refugees who "would face" certain unwarranted treatment;
the refugee definition speaks of "well-founded fear" of persecution.
Although the jurisprudence examining these terms has not articulated
precise definitions, the weight of authority interprets the "would face
threats" language of Article 33 as requiring a greater showing that the
316. Id. at 77-78.
This development is demonstrated by the international condemnation that has greeted the
recent policy of Thailand to push people back to sea. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988, at A], col. 1.
The Thai border authorities have been harshly criticized for violating the basic non-
refoulement obligation of international law by refusing to allow even temporary landings at
their border during which the refugee claims of the boat people could be examined. Helton,
Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1988, at A30, col. 4. Although the European laws
restricting the entry of asylum-seekers will result in people being put back onto airplanes
rather than boats and thus do not conjure up such harsh images, the method of return is not
legally significant. The non-refoulement principle prohibits all methods of denying entry to
refugees and returning them to face threats to their lives or freedom. 1951 Refugee
Convention, supra note 7, art. 33. While it is true that Article 33 does not bind signatories to
protect everyone in the world whose life or freedom is threatened, it significantly limits the
signatories' freedom to reject the small group of refugees who manage to arrive at or in its
territory. Id.
317. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 427 n.22 (1984).
318. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 33.
319. Id. art. 1 (a)(2).
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feared threats will materialize than that required by the "well-
founded fear" language.3 2 ° Second, Article 33 refers to threats to "life
or freedom"; the refugee definition refers to "persecution". Again,
the distinction between these terms is not self-evident. Arguably,
however, the more specific term, "threats to life or freedom," com-
prises only a portion of the mistreatment that can legitimately be
characterized as "persecution". Therefore, only those refugees who
can show not only a well-founded fear of persecution upon return but
also a greater threat of persecution that rises to the level of threat to
life or freedom would be entitled to protection under Article 33.
Because these two differences in language allow Article 33 to be
interpreted more narrowly than the refugee definition, Article 33 may
not provide protection to all refugees, but rather only to that subcat-
egory of refugees who can show with sufficient likelihood threats to
their lives or freedom. Even if one accepts this narrow interpretation
of Article 33, however, recent laws permitting summary rejection of
asylum-seekers violate the Article 33 prohibition against returning
refugees to countries where they face threats to their lives or freedom.
These new restrictive provisions allow - indeed, encourage - rejec-
tion of asylum-seekers after such a cursory examination that errors
are bound to occur. Although not all asylum-seekers will satisfy the
refugee definition, and not all the refugees will fall into the subcat-
egory of refugees to whom Article 33 arguably applies, some of the
people incorrectly turned away will face threats to their lives or free-
dom when they are returned to the countries they fled. The return of
these individuals will violate the fundamental Convention obligation
of non-refoulement. Accordingly, countries that intentionally place
into effect procedures that obviously will result in erroneous, and
unlikely to be corrected, decisions about asylum-seekers whose return
will result in threats to their lives or freedom are violating their non-
refoulement duty.
Of the recent legal developments examined in this article, only the
Belgian and Danish legislation include provisions that acknowledge
the non-refoulement obligation embodied in Article 33. The Belgian
law provides that an asylum-seeker rejected in a summary proceeding
320. See Stevic v. INS, 467 U.S. at 407 ("would face threats" requires a showing that it is
more likely than not that the threatened acts will occur); INS v. Cardoza.Fonseca. 480 U.S.
421 (1987) ("well-founded fear" does not require showing that it is more likely than not that
persecution will occur); Matter of Mogharrabi, Board of Immigration Appeals, Interim
Decision 3028, June 12, 1987 ("well-founded fear" requires a showing that reasonable person
in same circumstances would fear persecution; reasonable person may fear persecution even
when likelihood of persecution is less than probable).
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at the border has a right to seek a judicial hearing on the single issue
of whether his return would lead to threats to his life or freedom.32'
In contrast, the Danish legislation expressly forbids the Danish
administrative authorities from expelling an asylum-seeker to a coun-
try where he would be persecuted, but provides for no judicial review
of non-refoulement claims by asylum-seekers.322 The speed with
which the asylum-seeker at the Belgian border must prepare and pres-
ent his claim to a judge renders it difficult to assemble an effective,
well-documented case. Similarly, the lack of judicial oversight weak-
ens the Danish law. Nonetheless, these legislative provisions at least
recognize the non-refoulement requirement imposed by Article 33 and
make minimal attempts to satisfy it.
The practical problem with the Belgian and Danish non-refoule-
ment provisions, and also with the German and Dutch laws, is that
many refugees may be unable at the border or in an airport or as they
board an airplane or ship to produce unequivocal proof of the danger
they face.323 Circumstances that produce refugees often do not admit
of thorough gathering of documentary proof. Bona fide refugees who
at the moment lack compelling proof of the threats to their lives or
freedom are just as entitled to the protection of Article 33 as refugees
fortunate enough to have collected better proof. Under the new laws
allowing summary border rejections and imposing fines on air carriers
and shipping companies, however, refugees are likely to be turned
away and returned to dangerous situations. The inadequate proce-
dural safeguards - the cursory interview, the untrained interviewers,
the pressure to make immediate decisions, the lack of a record, the
lack of meaningful review, the incentive to deny entry - necessarily
will result in the summary rejection of bona fide refugees. Those
rejected who, as a consequence, face threats to their lives or freedom,
will have been deprived of the protection guaranteed by Article 33.
Fifth, the new legal measures in Belgium, Denmark, the Federal
Republic, and the Netherlands arguably provide sufficient protection
because most asylum-seekers arriving at the borders or in the airports
of these four countries have not come directly from the countries in
321. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 102 and 115-20 and accompanying text.
323. It may well be that in most instances, ifa refugee at the border can show unequivocally
that his life or freedom will be threatened if he is turned away, the governments of Belgium,
Denmark, the Federal Republic, and the Netherlands will not deny him admission. Their
sense of moral, as well as legal, obligation will permit entry. Even if this were always true, it
does not justify the enactment of procedures so summary that refugees with bona fide claims
but less than unequivocal proof are turned away by border guards.
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-which they fear persecution.324 Returning these individuals to the
country from which they came to Europe may not return them to the
land where their life or freedom would be threatened.
Nevertheless, asylum-seekers in Europe need more protection than
the new laws provide. In fact, many asylum-seekers do come to
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, and the Netherlands
directly from their homelands.325 Moreover, although a much larger
group of asylum-seekers are indirect arrivals who first surreptitiously
left their homelands for neighboring countries and then left those
third countries for Europe, these asylum-seekers may still present via-
ble non-refoulement claims. They may face threats to their lives or
freedom in the third countries if sent back there. Even worse, how-
ever, the third countries may return them to their homelands, where
the real threats to life or freedom would occur.326
The likelihood of an eventual return to the land of persecution
increases, of course, when the third country is not a signatory of the
1951 Refugee Convention and therefore is not bound by Article 33.
The problem, however, is not limited to non-signatories. Instances
have occurred in which two signatory nations reached different con-
clusions concerning the likelihood of threats to life or freedom in a
third country.327 In such cases, country A may have decided that it
should not send asylum-seekers back to country C, but have returned
them to country B, which had no compunctions about sending asy-
lum-seekers back to country C. This type of two-step return to dan-
ger constitutes a violation of Article 33 just as much as a direct return
324. For example, it is relatively rare that an Iranian asylum-seeker would go to Teheran
and book passage directly to Frankfurt. Rather, the Iranian, following the age-old tradition of
asylum-seekers, will usually make his way from his homeland to a third country where he then
books passage to Europe. Ironically, Iranian asylum-seekers who do fly directly from Teheran
to Frankfurt, perhaps with the assistance of a generous sum of money paid to airport
personnel, often find it difficult to obtain asylum because the inference that they have no well-
founded fear of persecution is drawn from their "legal" departure. Klever Interview, supra
note 147.
325. Eastern Europeans who flee to the Federal Republic or Denmark provide an obvious
example of this group of asylum-seekers.
326. For example, an Iranian who came to the Federal Republic via Turkey might be sent
back to Turkey by German officials and then returned to Iran by Turkish authorities. Cf.
supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. Or a Third World refugee who attempted to enter
Denmark from the German Democratic Republic might be turned back to East Germany,
which would then return him to his homeland. At the present moment, this particular
scenario is unlikely to occur due to the agreement between Denmark and the German
Democratic Republi, supra note 168, but it has been a problem in the past and could recur in
the future.
327. For an example of such a case, see supra note 113.
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does.328 To conclude otherwise would allow countries to evade their
legal obligations by doing indirectly what they are prohibited from
doing directly. Therefore, the procedural protections required to
make accurate non-refoulement decisions are necessary even if most
asylum-seekers arrive in Europe after having passed through coun-
tries in which their lives or freedom were not threatened.
Consequently, European governments cannot excuse their cursory
border decisions by pointing to the fact that they, by and large, return
asylum-seekers only to third countries in which the asylum-seekers do
not face imminent danger. They must also assure themselves that
those third countries will not return the asylum-seekers to countries
where their lives or freedom are threatened. The summary rejection
procedures appear to ignore the possibility that there may be a second
step to the return process. In this respect, the procedures recently
established in Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the Netherlands do not adequately observe the non-refoulement
obligation of Article 33.
2. The Lack of Enforcement
As described above, the procedural deficiencies of the new laws in
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, and the Netherlands
ensure that these signatory nations will violate Article 33. Unfortu-
nately, the 1951 Refugee Convention lacks an effective mechanism to
enforce the terms of Article 33. The Convention provides that dis-
putes between parties to the Convention may be referred to the Inter-
national Court of Justice.329  A refugee whose rights under the
Convention have been violated is without recourse. Only a nation that
is a signatory to the Convention has standing to bring a case before
the International Court of Justice.330 Although it is theoretically pos-
sible that a signatory could sue another signatory for violating Article
33 by sending a refugee back to a land in which his life or freedom
would be threatened, in reality this never happens. Each signatory is
328. A two-stage return implicates two nations in the violation of the non-refoulement
principle. The fact that a second nation actually places the refugee on the airplane back to the
country of persecution and violates the duty of non-refoulement does not absolve the first
country of complicity in this return, if the first country had reason to know the refugee lacked
a sufficient guarantee against deportation to the country of persecution. Cf. supra notes 102-
114 and accompanying text.
329. Article 38 provides: "Any dispute between parties to this Convention relating to its
interpretation or application, which cannot be settled by other means shall be referred to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute." 1951
Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 38 (emphasis added).
330. Id.
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-reluctant to criticize other signatories for fear that its own refugee
practices will, in turn, be criticized. 331
In addition, a dispute must generate a significant amount of hostil-
ity and ill will before it results in a suit at the International Court of
Justice. Practices that adversely affect individual refugees, a power-
less group of people, are unlikely to generate sufficient interest and
concern to trigger a formal proceeding before this forum. More
importantly, when problems of refugee populations cause friction
between nations, diplomatic pressure and negotiation are more effec-
tive means of resolving the dispute than litigation. As a result, these
informal methods are the general mode of resolution. Although infor-
mal resolution may often be preferable to litigation, diplomatic pres-
sure is unlikely to be triggered by incorrect decisions concerning
individual refugees refused entry at the border. In consequence, viola-
tions of Article 33 occur and go unredressed. Therefore, although the
rejection of refugees at the border that is countenanced by the new
laws of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, and the Nether-
lands violates Article 33, this is unlikely to be curtailed by any inter-
national adjudication pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
B. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,332 which entered into force in 1953, has
been signed by 21 nations, including Belgium, Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands.333 In contrast to the
1951 Geneva Convention, the Human Rights Convention does not
focus on refugees. Rather, it attempts to protect the basic civil rights
of all people within the jurisdiction of the signatory states.3" Indeed,
the Human Rights Convention contains no explicit references to refu-
gees. Nonetheless, some terms of this Convention potentially provide
protection for refugees.
L The Prohibition Against Inhuman Treatment
Of particular interest is Article 3, which states: "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment." 335
331. Klever Interview, supra note 147.
332. Human Rights Convention, supra note 8.
333. Id. All 21 members of the Council of Europe have signed the Convention.
334. The parties reaffirm "their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are
the foundation of justice and peace in the world. Human Rights Convention. supra note 8.
preamble. The Convention then lists these fundamental freedoms. Id. arts. 2-12.
335. Human Rights Convention, supra note 8, art. 3.
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Arguably, sending an individual back to a country in which his life or
freedom will be threatened constitutes inhuman treatment. Decisions
issued by the European Commission of Human Rights, a body estab-
lished by the Human Rights Convention to ensure that signatories
observe their obligations under the Convention,336 support this view.
The Commission acknowledges, of course, that under traditional
international law a nation has the right to admit or expel non-citizens
from its territories.337 The Commission also acknowledges that the
Convention does not guarantee to non-citizens of a nation the right to
enter that nation's territory.338 Nonetheless, the Commission has
unequivocally stated that in certain circumstances the denial of entry
or expulsion of a non-citizen might rise to the level of inhuman treat-
ment within the meaning of Article 3.339
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission reasoned that signato-
ries of the Convention have limited their rights, including the right to
control the entry and exit of foreigners, under general international
law to the extent they have agreed to be bound by the terms of the
Convention. 310 The Commission also reasoned that the Human
Rights Convention obliges each signatory country to apply the Con-
vention provisions to all those in the country, whether or not they are
entitled to be present.341 Further, the Commission ruled that
returning an individual to a country in which the basic human rights
guaranteed by the Convention are ignored or grossly violated consti-
336. Article 19 of the Human Rights Convention establishes two bodies to enforce the
provisions of the agreement: the European Commission of Human Rights ("the
Commission") and the European Court of Human Rights ("the Court"). Article 20 defines
the membership of the Commission; articles 21-37 establish the procedures of the Commission;
article 38 defines the membership of the Court; and articles 39-56 establish the procedures of
the Court.
337. See, e.g., Decision of 30 June 1959, App. No. 434/58, 2 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Hum. Rts.
(Eur. Com'n H.R.) 354, 372.
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Nazih-al-Kuzbari v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
26, 36 (1963) (finding that although deportation or extradition of a foreigner to a particular
country might in exceptional circumstances constitute inhuman treatment, such circumstances
did not exist on the facts of this case); X v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 14 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 15,
24, 26 (1964) (in certain circumstances, extradition might violate Article 3 of the Convention's
prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment); X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 32 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 87, 95 (1969) (holding application inadmissible because it failed to prove
expulsion to Poland constituted inhuman treatment); X v. Switzerland, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
205, 219 (1980) (applicant did not show that expulsion to United Arab Emirates would expose
him to inhuman treatment there).
340. See, e.g., Decision of 30 June 1959, supra note 337.
341. See, e.g., Amekrane v. The United Kingdom, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Hum. Rts. 356
(Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
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-tutes inhuman treatment.3 4 2 For example, the Commission held that
allegations that an individual returned to his homeland would face the
death sentence or a long prison term for his prior political activity
state a claim under Article 3.3.3 Thus, under this reasoning, the turn-
ing away of refugees who face prison or death at home due to their
race, religion, nationality, social group membership, or political opin-
ion would constitute a violation of the Human Rights Convention.
One Commission decision, Amekrane v. United Kingdom,34" graph-
ically illustrates this point. In Amekrane the Commission ruled that
returning an asylum-seeker to his homeland constituted a violation of
Article 3.345 Despite Amekrane's sudden arrival in a European coun-
try without permission to enter, the Commission concluded that he
was protected by the Human Rights Convention. 346
Amekrane, an officer in the Moroccan Air Force, was involved in
an unsuccessful coup attempt against the Moroccan government. He
immediately fled Morocco, flew to Gibraltar, and requested asylum.
Approximately twenty-four hours later the British government
returned Amekrane to Moroccan custody. Six months later, after a
secret trial, Amekrane was executed by a firing squad in Morocco.
Amekrane's widow filed a complaint with the Commission contend-
ing that the British government had violated Article 3 of the
Convention. 347
The United Kingdom argued that under international law it had
the right to return an undesirable non-citizen to his homeland or to
the country from which he had departed for the United Kingdom.- 8
Britain contended that it had concluded that Amekrane's presence in
Gibraltar was not "conducive to the public good," and that therefore
he was an undesirable alien.349 Furthermore, Britain pointed out that
Amekrane's presence violated the local Gibraltar law, which prohib-
ited non-Gibraltarians from entering or staying in Gibraltar without a
permit. 350 Emphasizing that the Human Rights Convention does not
guarantee a right to political asylum and does not guarantee a right to
enter the territory of a country of which the applicant is not a
342. See, eg., cases cited supra note 339.
343. Decision of 30 March 1966 [Application 2240/64] (unpublished).
344. Amekrane v. The United Kingdom, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Hum. Rts. 356 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
345. Id. at 382.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 370.
348. Id. at 372.
349. Id. at 372.
350. Id. at 374.
1988]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
national,351 the United Kingdom denied it had committed any viola-
tion of Article 3.
The Commission rejected the United Kingdom's interpretation of
the treaty.352 Based on the circumstances surrounding the return of
Amekrane to Morocco, the Commission concluded that Britain's
return of Amekrane to Morocco may have constituted inhuman treat-
ment and thus have violated Article 3.353 Accordingly, the Commis-
sion refused Britain's plea to dismiss the complaint.354 Concluding
that Amekrane had stated a claim under Article 3, the Commission
ordered further proceedings to examine the truth of the parties' alle-
gations and the merits of the claim.355 Subsequently, the United
Kingdom reached a friendly settlement with Amekrane's widow.3 56
The United Kingdom paid her compensation and the case ended.3 57
Although the Amekrane case obviously possesses significance for
asylum-seekers turned away by European countries, the clear proof
available distinguishes Amekrane from the more typical case.
Amekrane was a high-ranking officer; he was involved in clearly polit-
ical activity; his political activity was easily documentable; and the
proof of the misfortune he faced on return was also easily verifiable.
Most refugees, in contrast to Amekrane, will not have such clear-cut
proof of the dangers to their lives or freedom.
Nonetheless, the Commission's legal rulings in the Amekrane case
should have a broad impact on the claims submitted by other refu-
gees. In Amekrane the Commission refused to construe Article 3 as
subordinate to a country's right to return an undesirable alien or an
illegal entrant. 358  Notwithstanding the absence from the Human
Rights Convention of a right to asylum or a right to enter another
nation's territory, the Commission interpreted Article 3 to limit a
government's right to return a non-citizen to countries in which he
351. Id.
352. Id. at 372.
353. Id. at 382.
354. Id. at 388.
355. Id.
356. See European Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Report of the Commission: Amekrane v. The
United Kingdom 4 (July 19, 1974) [hereinafter Amekrane Report]; Sec'y to Eur. Comm'n on
Hum. Rts., Stock-taking on the European Convention on Human Rights 1954-1984, at 122
(1984) [hereinafter Stock-taking 1954-1984]. The enforcement procedures of the Human
Rights Convention strongly encourage friendly settlements. See Human Rights Convention,
supra note 8, arts. 28, 30, and 47.
357. In return for £37,500 Mrs. Amekrane withdrew her application to the Commission.
Amekrane Report, supra note 356, at 5; Stock-taking 1954-1984, surpa note 356, at 122.
358. Amekrane v. The United Kingdom, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Hum. Rts. at 382.
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-would face threats to his life or freedom.3 59 The Amekrane case thus
provides support for the view that legislative provisions that result in
the return of refugees to circumstances threatening their lives or free-
dom violate Article 3. Accordingly, the laws of Belgium, Denmark,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands that permit
summary, virtually unappealable rejection of asylum-seekers may on
many occasions run afoul of the Human Rights Convention.
2. The Potential for Enforcement
This collision of laws restricting entry of asylum-seekers with Arti-
cle 3 of the Human Rights Convention is important because the Con-
vention provides a potential remedy. In contrast to the 1951 Refugee
Convention, the Human Rights Convention sets up enforcement
mechanisms that allow individuals as well as nations to file petitions
alleging violations of the Convention. 36° Accordingly, the reluctance
of one nation to sue another nation and incur the resulting ill will
need not stand in the way of invoking the Convention's dispute reso-
lution process. Not surprisingly, most petitions received by the Com-
mission challenging government actions under the Human Rights
Convention are initiated by individuals .3 6  Accordingly, an individual
asylum-seeker denied admission who, as a consequence, faces threats
to his life or freedom can file a complaint with the Human Rights
Commission alleging violation of Article 3.
Despite the availability of individual suits, the jurisprudence ana-
lyzing the protection Article 3 extends to refugees is relatively unde-
359. Id.
360. Article 24 of the Human Rights Convention provides: "Any High Contracting Party
may refer to the Commission... any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention by
another High Contracting Party." Human Rights Convention, supra note 8, art. 24.
Article 25(1) provides in part:
The Commission may receive petitions . . . from any person, non-governmental
organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of
the High Contracting Parties of the Rights set forth in this Convention, provided that
the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared
that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.
Id. art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
Thus, by signing the Human Rights Convention, a nation opens itself to suit by another
signatory nation. Only those signatories that affirmatively confer standing on individuals who
wish to challenge its observance of the Convention obligations are subject to claims by individ-
uals. To date, 19 of the 21 signatories permit claims to be initiated by individuals. Only
Cyprus and Malta have not granted individuals standing to file petitions against them with the
Commission. See T. Buergenthal, International Human Rights in a Nutshell 89 (1988).
361. During the period 1955-1981, individuals filed 9.620 applications with the
Commission. Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Annual Review 1981, at 49 (1982). During this
same period, member states filed 10 actions. Id. at 36.
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veloped. In terms of the numbers of asylum-seekers rejected from
European countries, the Commission has received few refugee
claims.362 Three factors appear to explain this. First, those asylum-
seekers denied entry generally have been sent away so quickly that
there has been neither time nor legal assistance available for filing
claims with the Human Rights Commission. Second, those asylum-
seekers who have been permitted to enter and then subsequently are
expelled, although under less time pressure than those denied entry at
the border, often find the Commission's procedures cumbersome and
onerous. In particular, the Commission's requirement that claimants
demonstrate that they have exhausted all domestic remedies means
that asylum-seekers may have to wait years before they can file appli-
cations with the Commission.363 Third, many refugee advocates and
lawyers have been unaware that the Human Rights Convention con-
tains potential protection for asylum-seekers and are unfamiliar with
the Convention's enforcement procedures.364 Assisting refugees is
rarely a lucrative practice for lawyers. As a consequence, there are
many more refugee clients than attorneys can handle. Accordingly,
refugee advocates are often overworked and underpaid. Keeping
informed about the many developments in their national law is often
all they can manage to do. Learning about a whole new procedure for
a Commission based in another country - and a procedure that is
technical and can only be invoked after all national remedies have
been exhausted - may seem a luxury that they cannot afford.365
Nonetheless, although it has been a relatively rare occurrence, asy-
lum-seekers have filed claims with the Commission seeking protection
from expulsion.366 Many of the claims alleging that returning an asy-
362. Lecture by Andrew Drzemczewski, Staff of European Commission on Human Rights,
in Strasbourg, France, (Nov. 14, 1986); see also R. Plender, Problems Raised by Certain
Aspects of the Present Situation of Refugees from the Standpoint of the European Commission
on Human Rights 26 (European Commission Human Rights Files No. 9, 1984).
363. Article 26 of the Human Rights Convention provides: "The Commission may only
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted .... " Human Rights
Convention, supra note 8, art. 26.
364. See, e.g., Interview with Gunnar Homann, Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany
(Nov. 30, 1986) (busy lawyers juggling private practice and pro bono refugee cases often not
familiar with enforcement potential and procedures of Human Rights Convention).
365. To remedy this situation the European Legal Network on Asylum (ELENA), a group
of lawyers in Europe who represent refugees, organized a conference on the Human Rights
Convention. The conference, held at the Human Rights Commission headquarters in
Strasbourg, France from June 26-29, 1987, focused on the Convention provisions applicable to
refugees and on the jurisdiction and practice of both the Commission and the Court.
366. See 1 Dig. Strasbourg Case Law § 3.0.3.4 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rts. 1984) (collected
decisions regarding Article 3 of the Convention and the expulsion of aliens).
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-lum-seeker to his homeland violates the prohibition of Article 3
against inhuman treatment have been dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence of a serious threat to life or freedom. 36' As Amekrane
shows, this need not always be the case.
Although Amekrane signifies that successful invocation of the
Human Rights Convention by asylum-seekers protesting refoulement
is possible, in most cases the Human Rights Convention does not fur-
nish a practical remedy. This is due to two factors: (1) the enforce-
ment mechanisms established by the Convention do not contemplate
providing routine relief to individuals; (2) most asylum-seekers do not
possess the resources necessary to resort to the Convention to protect
their rights.
To ensure the observance of its provisions, the Convention estab-
lishes both a European Commission of Human Rights and a Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. All complaints must first be presented
to the Commission.3 68 Furthermore, many of the claims presented to
the Commission are dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic reme-
dies.369 For those claims that survive the exhaustion requirement, the
enforcement process moves slowly. The Commission places great
emphasis on threshold admissibility questions. 3 0  The Commission
procedure is heavily weighted toward encouraging the parties to reach
a friendly settlement of their dispute.37 ' It is the extraordinarily rare
case that ever emerges from the Commission and reaches the
Court." In short, the enforcement process is a slow bureaucratic
one. It bears little resemblance to a court of first instance, in which
litigants routinely file suit and seek speedy resolution of their individ-
ual claims.
367. See Plender, supra note 362, at 26.
368. Article 47 provides: "The Court may only deal with a case after the Commission has
acknowledged the failure of efforts for a friendly settlement .... " Human Rights Convention.
supra note 8, art. 47.
369. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
370. Articles 26 and 27 list various threshold issues that warrant dismissal of a claim as
"inadmissible." Grounds of inadmissibility include anonymous filings, prior adjudication.
statute of limitations (6 months), manifestly ill-founded claims, failure to exhaust domestic
remedies, abusive claims, and claims incompatible with the terms of the Convention. Human
Rights Convention, supra note 8, arts. 26 and 27.
371. For example, Article 28 provides: "In the event of the Commission accepting a
petition referred to it... it shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view
to securing a friendly settlement of the matter. ... " Human Rights Convention. supra note 8,
art. 28. Article 30 details procedures to be followed after friendly settlement reached and
Article 47 provides that the European Court of Human Rights may deal with a case onl) after
attempts at friendly settlement have failed. Id. arts. 30 and 47.
372. See T. Buergenthal, supra note 360, at 98-101.
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This is not surprising because the Commission and the Court are
international tribunals. The litigation before them does not concern
private disputes; all claims challenge a national law or policy. There-
fore, the decisions they reach often have diplomatic implications.
Accordingly, the process is deliberate and slow. Despite the frustra-
tions of the process, the decisions of the Commission and Court are
important. Although for most asylum-seekers the hope of receiving
an individual remedy under the Convention is illusory, the few cases
in which asylum-seekers are successful are likely to have a significant
impact far beyond the individual claimants.
Being prepared to persevere through a lengthy, deliberate process
does not obviate the second problem, the lack of adequate resources
to pursue effectively applications filed with the Commission. It is, of
course, obvious that simply filing a strongly worded complaint will
not be sufficient. It is also obvious that only an asylum-seeker who
has managed to find some protection from threats to his freedom will
be able to muster the necessary attention to present his claim ade-
quately. Respite from persecution is not sufficient, however. Only an
asylum-seeker with additional other resources will be able to frame an
application that is sufficiently strong to lead to an inquiry into the
merits. An asylum-seeker must have access to fairly compelling proof
of his claims. As a practical matter, he must also have access to
skilled legal assistance in order to have any chance of success under
the Human Rights Convention. These requirements mean that there
will be few asylum-seekers who will be able to prepare a credible
claim and present it to the Commission. Of those who file a credible
claim, few will ultimately prevail. Thus, for most asylum-seekers
rejected entry at the border or prohibited from boarding airplanes
bound for European countries, the European Convention on Human
Rights will not provide solace.
Nonetheless, the Convention has the real potential to provide a
powerful tool with which to challenge the recent laws restricting
entry. A test case strategy may yield positive results that far exceed
the beneficial results gained by the individual litigants. To pursue
such a strategy, several cases must be carefully selected. The cases
must then be thoroughly prepared in order to expose the deficiencies
in the summary procedures and the hardship that results from errone-
ous decisions. They must be presented to the Commission and to the
Court, if they proceed that far, by skilled advocates. One or two suc-
cessful test cases challenging the inhuman treatment that results when
asylum-seekers are sent away by border guards and police officers
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-who turn a deaf ear to reports of the threats to lives or freedom that
await the asylum-seekers at home would have a powerful impact.
A decision that these procedurally inadequate legislative provisions
result in violations of Article 3 might lead to the enactment of more
suitable procedures. Short of new legislation, nations might adminis-
tratively revise their practices to ensure a more accurate decision-
making process. They could provide competent officials trained in
refugee law at airports and other main entry points, for example.
Whether accomplished legislatively or administratively, if the proce-
dures applied to asylum-seekers in airports and at the borders are
improved so that there is far less chance of arbitrary and summary
decisions, the rights of refugees will be better protected in Belgium,
Denmark, the Federal Republic, and the Netherlands. Moreover,
because the imposition of restrictive entry criteria and summary bor-
der procedures appears to constitute a European trend, a positive
response from the European Human Rights Commission would prob-
ably also improve the situation of asylum-seekers in many other Euro-
pean countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
The great increase in the number of asylum-seekers from Asia and
Africa reaching Europe in the 1980's generated fears that European
countries would soon become inundated with Third World refugees.
These fears, in turn, led to legislative action in Belgium, Denmark,
and the Federal Republic of Germany restricting the entry of asylum-
seekers. Administrative, rather than legislative, changes in the
Netherlands resulted in similar restrictive policies.
Two provisions commonly recur in the newly restrictive laws.
Greater authority has been delegated to border guards and regular
police officials to deny entry to asylum-seekers. Financial penalties
have been imposed on airlines and other companies that transport
improperly documented asylum-seekers. Both measures share com-
mon failings. They ensure that the initial decision concerning admis-
sion of an asylum-seeker is generally made after a cursory
interrogation by an official untrained in international or municipal
refugee law. The lack of an adequate record of the initial decision, the
inability to obtain legal assistance, and the time pressures that prevent
gathering evidence to support further the asylum-seeker's claim
ensure that any appeal that is permitted fails to provide a meaningful
opportunity for review. Thus, snap decisions of border guards and
airline personnel are virtually unreviewable. Such inadequate and
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unfair procedures necessarily will result in a number of erroneous
decisions.
Erroneous decisions may return refugees to countries in which their
lives or freedom are threatened. Such errors constitute a violation of
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. Although Article 33 of the 1951
Refugee Convention explicitly prohibits the return of refugees whose
lives or freedom are threatened, the lack of an enforcement mecha-
nism that can be initiated by an individual refugee undercuts any
effective protection the 1951 Refugee Convention offers asylum-seek-
ers improperly rejected in a summary proceeding at the border. The
possibility of individual enforcement action provided by the Human
Rights Convention, however, allows these restrictive procedures to be
challenged. Although the remedial procedures set forth by the
Human Rights Convention do not promise relief to the routine indi-
vidual litigant, cases concerning asylum-seekers denied entry despite
strong proof of threats to life and freedom may well be adjudicated as
violations of Article 3's prohibition of inhuman treatment. Several
carefully selected test cases challenging the summary rejection proce-
dures as inconsistent with Article 3 should be initiated with the
Human Rights Commission. A successful result would likely have a
strong negative impact on the recent European trend of turning away
asylum-seekers based on a procedure that lacks the minimal afe-
guards necessary to ensure correct and fair decisions.
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